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ABSTRACT
Wyatt Earp has been depicted in print and on film numerous times since his 
most infamous exploits in Dodge City, Kansas and Tombstone, Arizona in the late 
nineteenth century. However, such depictions are hardly uniform. Rather, Wyatt 
Earp has proven to be a particularly mercurial figure; at times, he is a noble paragon 
of virtue, and others, a corrupt authoritarian. This thesis analyzes depictions of 
Wyatt Earp in five Cold War films—My Darling Clementine (1946), Gunfight at the
O.K. Corral (1957), Hour of the Gun (1967), Doc (1971), and Tombstone (1993) —in terms 
of their shifting depictions of Wyatt Earp, arguing that Earp serves as a figure 
through which American audiences are able to deal with particular historical 
anxieties borne out their nation's foreign policy w ith regard to the Cold War.
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1. "If Everything Isn't Black and White, I Say 'Why the 
Hell Not?"': Theorizing the Western
On August 12 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner presented his paper "The 
Significance of the Frontier in American History" at a session of the American 
Historical Association in Chicago, at the World Columbian Exhibition. In his paper 
Turner articulated his now-famous "frontier thesis": the idea that the frontier 
experience is what defined America and Americans. According to Turner, the 
frontier was the space at which the European colonist became an American. Turner 
argued, "the peculiarity of American institutions is the fact that they have been 
compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people . . .  
developing at each area of this progress out of the primitive economic conditions of 
the frontier and into the complexity of city life" (2). For Turner, the American 
character was created by "the existence of an area of free land, its continuous 
recession, and the advance of the American settlement westward" (2). The frontier 
experience, according to Turner, is peculiar to America, which is set apart from 
Europe by the virtues the frontier instills in its people. America, Turner argued, was 
continually reborn at the line where "civilization" met "savagery"; the frontier was a 
crucible in which the Americans and their nation were forged time and time again.
But the Columbian Exhibition is not significant to scholars for Turner's 
presentation alone, as influential as it has been. For, while Turner was ruminating 
on the American frontier experience, elsewhere in Chicago equally significant 
cultural events were taking place. Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show, replete with
daring rescues, runaway stagecoaches, and fancy gunplay, presented a far more 
romantic vision of the West than Turner's paper suggested. Bill Cody's 
presentation, as mythological as it may have been, has become ingrained in 
American culture as the epitome of the "Wild West." Meanwhile, other visitors to 
the Exhibition turned out to see Thomas Edison demonstrate his new invention, the 
Kinetoscope. With Edison's invention, "moving pictures" became a viable medium 
of information exchange.
Neither Turner, Cody, nor Edison could have realized it, but the World 
Columbian Exhibition presented a unique convergence of events that would 
influence the way Americans would view their past and themselves for generations 
to come. Indeed, the chance intersection of these events foreshadowed the 
emergence of a cultural phenomenon that would develop into a particularly 
American set of myths; the Western film. The Western would borrow Turner's 
conceptions of the West and American identity and fuse them with the aesthetics of 
Cody, and then transmit this combination through Edison's new medium, creating a 
film genre that American audiences could use, if unconsciously, to examine their 
own historical and contemporary culture.
Since the time of Turner, Cody, and Edison, the Western film has developed 
into one of the most enduring and popular genres in American cinema. Only ten 
years elapsed between Edison's Kinetoscope demonstration and the production of 
Edwin S. Porter's The Great Train Robbery, considered by some to be the first true 
Western film (Wright 5). Westerns have been a part of American film culture ever
since. Though the popularity of the genre has waxed and waned, western films 
have never vanished completely; indeed, it seems as though whenever scholars and 
critics begin to draft elegies for the genre, the Western immediately makes a 
resurgence. For example, Anthony Lejeune's 1989 lamentation that the number of 
Westerns appearing on screen was dwindling and the few that did appear 
"[possessed] qualities incompatible with the traditional form" (23) was followed by 
Dances loith Wolves, (1990), a major box office success and the first Western to win the 
Academy Award for Best Picture since Cimarron (1931). Only two years later, Clint 
Eastwood's Unforgiven repeated the feat. Similarly, in 2004 Gary Hoppenstand 
wrote in The Journal o f Popular Culture that the Western was all but dead and that 
filmmakers had to "trick" audiences into seeing Western films by fusing the genre 
w ith another (3). Hoppenstand's comments were followed by the premiere of the 
HBO series Deadwood, which became an instant popular and critical success in spite 
of its clear generic alignment, as well as the film Brokehack Mountain (2005), which 
received numerous accolades as well as eight Academy Award nominations
The Western's enduring popularity and significance in American culture can 
be attributed to its role as a unique American myth. Various scholars, including 
Slotkin, Wright, and Parks have commented in great detail on the Western's mythic 
status and, while their arguments are certainly enlightening and valid, their analyses 
miss the polysémie nature of the genre, which is a major contributor to its success. 
Indeed, while the Western is a mythic genre, it is not through this alone that the 
genre maintains its relevance. Rather, it is through the combination of the Western's
role as a foundation myth of the United States and its polysémie encounter with 
American history that the Western survives. The Western addresses American birth 
and growth but does not do so in a way that is necessarily triumphal or repentant. 
Instead the Western acts as what Newcomb and Hirsch have referred to as a 
"cultural forum" in which a variety of points of view are expressed. The cultural 
forum model is complemented by the Western's role as a "bad faith" narrative, as 
described by Forrest G. Robinson in his essay "The New Historicism and the Old 
West."i The Western does not offer a solitary vision of America's past or future. 
Instead, the genre serves as a liminal space in which its apparently progressive 
historical narrative is tempered by a subtextual acknowledgment of anxiety- 
inducing contemporary circumstances.
Analyzing what is meant by "the Western as myth" can be problematic. 
Traditionally, scholars of the Western have focused on a concept of myth that 
emphasizes the Western's status as a constructed narrative that communicates some 
meaning to society. Rita Parks has argued that a "myth . . .  refers to . . .  a metaphoric 
depiction of hum an experience" (14). According to Parks, myth serves to articulate 
certain ideas and concepts that are beyond the ability of standard human language 
to address. Consequently, mythical discourses rely on "archetypal elements —
 ^Robinson's term is similar to Sartre's concept of mauvaise foi in that both involve 
self-deception. However, Sartre's bad faith supposes that the subject conceives him 
or herself as an object in order to justify certain attitudes and actions. For Sartre, 
someone engages in bad faith in order to transfer guilt onto some supposedly 
uncontrollable aspect of the character; in Robinson, the "bad faith narrative" is also a 
means of comfort but is rather faith in a positive quality of the society at large rather 
than a controlling component to one's personality.
patterns of character, action, or structure that have recurred in verbal and visual 
storytelling since ancient times" (14). The "archetypal elements" contain a meaning 
beyond what they literally depict and translate abstract experiences or thoughts that 
are difficult to clearly express into concepts that are more readily understandable 
and communicable for a society and its members.
Parks' concept of myth as a means of communicating within a society is 
similar to the approach adopted by Will Wright in Six Guns and Society.'^ Wright 
argues that myths are simply "communication[s] from a society to its members"
(16). Wright emphasizes that myths, like any other language, must necessarily have 
rules of grammar and diction in order to be understood. The rules roughly 
correspond to the archetypes referred to by Parks. The myth, for Wright, 
communicates "the social concepts and attitudes determined by the history and 
institutions of a society" (16). Thus, the myth is a means of integration, 
communicating a socializing message that contributes to the development of a more 
ordered and unified society.
This idea is articulated and modified by Richard Slotkin in Gunfighter Nation. 
Slotkin agrees with Wright's suggestion that myths serve as socializing agents, 
arguing that myths symbolize "the society's ideology" and "[dramatize] its moral 
consciousness" (5). For Slotkin, as for Wright, myth serves a hegemonic purpose as 
a means to disseminate social ideology. However, Slotkin rejects Parks' notion of
2 Wright's approach is largely based on the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss. For a 
discussion of W right's approach in relation to Lévi-Strauss' work, see the appendix 
of Six Guns and Society.
myth being based on universal archetypes. Rather, Slotkin suggests that the 
development of a particular society's myth is entirely based on that society's history: 
myth is shaped by "historical contingencies rather than archetypes generated by 
either 'the nature of things' or 'the nature of language'" (8). Though he rejects the 
notion of any monomythical archetypes that arose from "human nature," Slotkin 
does recognize that mythmaking is an organic process within a society, through 
which a given society develops its own language of myth. Thus, like Parks and 
Wright, Slotkin essentially argues that myth functions as an abstract form of 
communication that bears special significance for a society. Slotkin writes that 
"through frequent retellings and deployments as a source of interpretive metaphors, 
the original mythic story is increasingly conventionalized until it is reduced to a 
deeply encoded and resonant set of symbols, 'icons,' 'keywords,' or historical 
clichés" (5). These icons and clichés are roughly analogous to Parks' archetypes, 
though derived from a different source.
Westerns are able to fit this role as a cultural carrier of myth by virtue of their 
nature as popular generic texts. In contemporary North American society, popular 
genre texts, whether the Western, the space opera, or the Harlequin-style romance, 
seem to be the texts that exemplify the qualities of myth as suggested by Slotkin, 
Wright, and Parks. As John Cawelti argues in The Six-Gun Mystique, "a popular 
form, like the Western, may encompass a number of standard plots. Indeed, one 
important reason for the continued use of a formula is its very ability to change and 
develop in response to the changing interests of audiences" (52). Cawelti argues
7that due to the heterogeneous nature of contemporary cultures, the role of primary 
distributor of social thought and values has fallen to the mass media (59). 
Furthermore, Cawelti suggests, formulaic expressions of mass media — like the 
Western film —play a particularly essential role in the mass media:
Formula stories seem to be the one way in which the individuals in a 
culture act out certain unconscious or repressed needs, or express in an 
overt and symbolic fashion certain latent motives which they then 
must give expression to, but cannot face openly. (60)
The Western film is an appropriate example of Cawelti's formula story. The 
Western, as most generic "formula texts," is often analyzed in terms of the strict 
formulas to which they adhere. Many scholars have examined the Western in terms 
of these structures. In his study of the most popular Western films released between 
1950 and 1970, Will Wright, for example, has identified several strict Western plot 
structures, including "the classical plot," "the professional plot," and "the 
transitional Western." Cawelti, meanwhile, paraphrases Western pulp writer Frank 
Gruber's identification of seven essential Western plots (61). The structure of 
Western films is reminiscent of the structure attributed to classical myths by scholars 
such as Claude Lévi-Strauss and Joseph Campbell. Thus, the formulaic nature of 
generic popular texts is ideal for the transmission of myth; indeed, formulaic texts 
such as the Western play a similar role in contemporary American culture as myths 
of gods and heroes might have played in the cultures that produced those tales.
Cawelti's suggestion that generic texts act as a medium in which a culture's 
"unconscious or repressed needs" are expressed is also supported by the cultural 
forum model of television proposed by Newcomb and Hirsch. Newcomb and 
Hirsch cite Fishe and Hartley's argument that that television fulfills a "bardic 
function" in contemporary societies (564), adding that in this capacity television 
presents the audience with "a multiplicity of meanings" that focus on "our most 
prevalent concerns, or deepest dilemmas" (564). Newcomb and Hirsch posit that 
television functions as a "cultural forum," presenting a polysémie narrative that 
allows the "multiplicity of meanings" to engage in a dialogue with one another and 
with the audience. A variety of messages and meanings can be extrapolated from 
the televisual text, allowing audience members to encounter not only their own 
points-of-view but also contradictory perspectives, permitting an essential, if 
unconscious, exchange of ideas and information. The polysémie nature of television 
does not provide any resolution to the televisual forum debate, and thus no 
dominant ideology emerges. As Newcomb and Hirsch put it, "television does not 
present firm ideological conclusions — despite its formal conclusions — so much as it 
comments on ideological problems" (565 -  6; emphasis original).
The cultural forum model is complemented by Forrest G. Robinson's concept 
of "bad faith," which similarly echoes Cawelti's argument. In "the New Historicism 
and the Old West," Robinson suggests that in the most popular texts, there are often 
multiple available readings that may appear to be contradictory. Robinson argues 
that this network of meanings often takes the form of an explicit and triumphal
surface narrative that is countered by a more subtle, subversive counternarrative 
(78). The dominant narrative serves to comfort the audience with an adulating story 
and thus allows the audience to safely address uncomfortable cultural issues — 
Robinson specifically mentions issues of gender and race — in a way that minimizes 
the tear of reprisal that addressing the subjects openly might entail. Thus, Robinson 
argues, the society — which is burdened by guilt through its members' roles as self- 
identified enfranchised citizens — may encounter and psychologically come to terms 
with various injustices ingrained in itself.
Though neither Newcomb and Hirsch nor Robinson are specifically 
addressing film with their arguments, their theses are certainly relevent to a 
discussion of films. Like Newcomb and Hirsch's television programs, films — 
especially those of the mass-market, "Hollywood" variety —are the product not of a 
single auteur but instead a group of people ranging from writers to producers to 
directors to marketers. Thus, the filmed text is a collective creation that avoids 
representing the ideology of any single mind. Furthermore, the mythic aspects of 
film are suggested by the ritualistic nature of viewing a film. Films can be viewed in 
theatres with large groups of people, and such a group engagement, combined with 
a following discussion of a film's merits or deficiencies as well as consumption of 
related materials from film reviews to merchandise, suggests that for many people 
the viewing of a film is far from passive entertainment. Additionally, film audiences 
actively support films directly through the purchase of tickets or rentals, and film- 
going often plays a role in other human rituals, such as courtship.
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However, this is not to say that all popular generic texts are dealing with the 
same social anxieties. Rather, texts of a particular genre are especially apt for the 
discussion of certain social anxieties. These issues are encoded into the genre of the 
text: the peculiar trappings of one genre suggest to the audience that it is a space in 
which one social problem can be examined. The shifts in generic elements signal 
shifts of language. The spy story, for example, might be best suited to discuss issues 
of privacy by virtue of the genre's typical narrative involving concealed information 
and privacy as well as the power associated with such things. When audience 
members recognize the narrative as a spy story, they are able to prepare themselves, 
unconsciously or not, for such a discursive shift and then are capable of entering the 
cultural forum debate that the text will present to them.
When discussing the Western, John Cawelti points to the genre's "historical 
setting" and "thematic emphasis on the establishment of law and order, and its 
resolution of the conflict between civilization and savagery on the frontier" as 
indicators that the Western is "a kind of foundation myth" (100). Cawelti compares 
the Western film to American Independence Day celebrations, but suggests that, 
unlike a July 4* celebration which "has no room for dramatic conflict and ambiguity 
of values, the Western is able to explore not only what was gained, but what was 
lost" (100). Cawelti, further suggesting the cultural forum and bad faith models, 
argues that the Western succeeds due to its confrontation with essential American 
social conflicts, but in particular, issues of faith:
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By creating a marginal hero whose style of behavior and mode of life 
identified him with those individuals and groups who, like the 
cowboy, belonged to a class that was rapidly becoming obsolete 
through social progress, these writers created a hero whose 
predicament reflected ambiguities of these ideals. (105)
The ideals Cawelti refers to are concepts such as manifest destiny and the "special 
historical mission of the country" (103), both of which are central to American self­
conception and Exceptionalism.
Garry Watson, in his analysis of Cawelti's work, suggests that what Cawelti is 
truly pointing at is that the Western is a depiction of sacrifice. According to Watson, 
"the western is the genre that typically dramatizes a sacrificial crisis, the violent 
resolution of which founds or refounds a community or nation" (1). This analysis 
alludes to both Frederick Jackson Turner's notion that the American nation is forged 
anew at the frontier and Richard Slotkin's titular phrase "regeneration through 
violence." The Western, as these arguments suggest, sanctifies the use of violence as 
a foundation of community, but also depicts the troubling nature of such a 
foundational narrative.
However, an identification of the Western as a narrative of faith and sacrifice 
is rather broad. One must also consider the historical setting of the Western. Both 
Rita Parks and John Lenihan have argued for a consideration of setting in any 
attempt to define what is meant by "Western" (Parks 27; Lenihan 12). Lenihan 
argues that the setting is a crucial part of Western iconography, and should "suggest
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the trans-Mississippi West from the Civil War to the turn of the century" (12). 
Lenihan goes on to articulate his idea that a key component of the Western is its 
dichotomous setting, or the inherent contrast between the land "that both threatened 
the pioneer society and promised future greatness" and the beginnings of 
civilization "that promised human fulfillment if immediate dangers could be met" 
(12). Lenihan's observation of the Western's primary dichotomy — the contrast 
between "civilization" and "the land" — is similar to aspects of the genre identified 
by Wright and Slotkin (14). Furthermore, this opposition is not only expressed 
through the setting. The binarism is also expressed through characterizations and 
representations of morality in Westerns. Many Westerns feature the opposition of 
the citizenry of the frontier town and some form of Other, whether Native 
American, lawless, anarchic bandit gangs, or rapacious businessmen run amok.
With such a variety of generic conventions as suggested by Lenihan, Slotkin, 
Wright, and others, settling on a single definition of "Western" is difficult at best. 
Emphasizing a geographical setting is unsatisfactory, as even the definition of what 
constitutes "the West" is a matter of debate. Indeed, Lenihan's insistence that the 
genre depicts "the trans-Mississippi West" is far too limiting and omits texts that are 
foundational to the genre, such as James Fenimore Cooper's frontier romances, not 
to mention the Westerns of other nations, including the Ned Kelly stories of 
Australia. On the other hand, a definition based on a fixed time period is also too 
limiting; it is entirely conceivable to see a Western set in contemporary times or even 
in the future. A reliance on a plot-based definition is also insufficient; in spite of the
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identifications of "essential plots" by Wright and others, some texts that are most 
assuredly Westerns fall outside of their rather rigid prescriptivism. Rather, the 
definition should be somewhat conceptual. The Western, then, is, broadly defined, a 
popular genre that depicts the conflict between forces of the wilderness — figurative 
or literal—and forces of incorporation—whether pioneers, ranchers, soldiers, or 
businesspeople—in a historical frontier setting.
However, the true generic essence of the Western is not located in such binary 
oppositions. Rather, it is found in the genre's concern with the liminal state between 
the dichotomies. The Western offers its audience a third, liminal space between the 
two opposing camps of civilization and wilderness. Furthermore, the gunfighter 
hero is not a "savage" Other as represented by cattle rustlers or American Indians, 
but neither is he as civilized as the schoolmarm for whom he must make the frontier 
safe. Thus, the Western and its heroes serve as spaces wherein the varying 
idealizations of the wild country and civilization can be placed in dialogue with 
each other. In this respect, the Western fulfills a function similar to that of the 
pastoral as described by Leo Marx. For Marx, the American pastoral setting is rural 
and has been touched by human influence, but maintains an idealized vision of 
nature. The human touch allows the audience of the American pastoral to submit to 
the myth of American progressivism while still addressing what is lost through 
industrial expansion (49). Marx links the pastoral to the essential myth of American 
origins and its emphasis on the redemptive possibility of "virgin land" (49). 
Ultimately, Marx suggests, the pastoral's status as a middle ground between the
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urban and the wild make it an ideal space in which a particular American audience 
is able to acknowledge the positive qualities of progressivism while expressing a 
deep anxiety about what has been lost in the march toward American capitalism 
(40).
The Western fulfills a nearly identical purpose, to the point where it is 
attractive to refer to the genre as the popular form of American pastoralism. Like 
the pastoral setting described by Marx, the Western exists in a state of "in­
betweenness" — the Western town has experienced the influence of progressive 
development but is still removed from the industrial "civilized" cities of the East. 
The Western town carries with it all the potential that the myth of American 
Progressivism would offer; however, the town is simultaneously threatened by the 
encroaching civilization and the capitalism that it involves, whether through a 
monopolizing cattle baron or unscrupulous railroad developers. Similarly, the 
Western town presents a natural environment that has been "improved" by settlers. 
The townsfolk are putting the previously unused resources to good use, and some 
mode of law, if somewhat rudimentary, has accompanied property rights. 
Nevertheless, the town still survives only under the threat of violence from some 
unpredictable force that civilization and its laws are incapable of handling on their
own.
Therefore, many of Marx's additional arguments concerning the pastoral can 
be applied to the Western. Marx especially emphasizes the pastoral's role as a 
location of dissension, identifying the genre as one that is consistently used as a
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symbol by dissident minorities. The pastoral is especially well-suited for this 
purpose because of its status as a liminal genre, and the genre's characters provide 
excellent fodder for issues of anxiety due to their status as liminal figures who exist 
in a stage between civilization and savagery. The Western performs a similar 
function: the precarious position of the Western town between the progressive East 
and the wild makes it an ideal location for dialogues of social anxiety. The 
Western's status as a historical genre, however, lends it a special significance that the 
pastoral cannot carry: it emphasizes the Western's role as a foundational tale as well 
as one that, even moreso than the pastoral, carries the burden of the failure of the 
Progressive myth, as well as reminding its audience of the cost of the sacrifice that 
went into its realization.
As Slotkin writes, "the conquest of the wilderness and the subjugation or 
displacement of the Native Americans who originally inhabited it has been the 
means to our achievement of a national identity, a democratic policy, an ever- 
expanding economy, and a phenomenonally dynamic and progressive civilization" 
(10). He adds, "the original ideological task of the [Western] Myth was to explain 
and justify the establishment of American colonies" (10). Certainly this is true; the 
Western can, as Coyne says, " [sanctify] territorial expansion [and justify] 
dispossession of the Indian" (3). However, it would be glib to suggest that the 
Western deals only with American expansion westward across the North American 
continent and the related subjugation of Native American peoples. The timing of 
the genre's peak in popularity problematizes this argument, which did not take
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place during a period of explicit colonization of aboriginal people but rather during 
a time of ideological colonialism at the height of the Cold War. Slotkin does offer 
some explanation for this, suggesting that after World War 11 the Western's 
ideological task had changed to provide a mythic explanation for "radical economic 
grow th[,]. . .  [the United States'] emergence as a powerful nation and . . .  [a] 
distinctively American approach to modernization" (10). However, this argument 
contradicts common perceptions regarding the function of the Western myth prior 
to World War 11. The Western never abandoned its colonial concern; it merely 
transformed it. The elements that the Western purportedly accounted for as Coyne 
and Slotkin see it are all the result of American imperialism after World War 11, and 
America's emergence as a superpower and economic titan corresponds with the 
rising popularity of the Western from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s. The territorial 
expansion that the Western in this period alludes to, then, is not merely expansion 
westward, but also expansion to the south and to the east. The Western is concerned 
not only with the birth and rebirth of the American in North America, but also 
worldwide. Indeed, the story of the Western is not necessarily limited to dealing 
with wagon trains moving to California or silver rushes in Arizona, but may also be 
about helicopters landing in Vietnam and Coca Cola becoming a popular soft drink 
in China or other more recent expressions of colonialism or imperialism. Thus, it is 
no surprise that the Western's popularity peaked at the height of the Cold War; the 
genre's emphasis on binary oppositions was ideal for a nation that sought to portray 
the world as a battlefield between diametrically opposed ideologies. The Native
17
Americans, misunderstood by many Americans, became an ideal Other onto which 
the perceived differences between the United States and its Communist foes could 
be projected.
However, given the polysémie nature of the Western, arguing with such 
absolutism is dangerous. Indeed, it should not be suggested that a colonial reading 
of the Western is the only available interpretation. However, given the genre's 
explicit concerns with history and American expansion, it is fair to suggest that 
colonialism is a dominant allegorical concern of the Western. The Western does not 
seek to "sanctify" colonialism, as Slotkin or Coyne might argue. Rather, through its 
status as a liminal myth, the genre merely seeks to address colonialism as but one of 
its multiple concerns. As Newcomb and Hirsch have suggested, a popular text such 
as the Western film does not provide any definitive ideological statement; rather, the 
genre presents a multiplicity of meanings through which its American audience is 
able to encounter various perspectives on American colonialism. Indeed, if the 
genre seems trium phal—if it seems to justify violent displacement of the Other and 
forceful interventionism abroad —it is only to fulfill Robinson's bad faith principle. 
The text must accommodate multiple viewpoints and provide its audience with a 
safe place in which to encounter ideas that may be objectionable or subversive 
alongside the adulation of the foundation and regeneration of the nation in violence. 
If the sacrifice presented in the Western is celebrated, it is also mourned through its 
recognition that the growth of the nation was irrigated with the blood of the 
innocent.
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In the following thesis, 1 will examine a number of Westerns in terms of the 
ways they encounter the United States' shifting position in foreign affairs during the 
Cold War. However, the following interpretations should not be understood as 
being the only available reading of the subjects. Indeed, as per the cultural forum 
model, the films that will be examined—My Darling Clementine, Gunfight at the OK 
Corral, Hour of the Gun, Doc, and Tombstone—constitute expressions of a variety of 
discourses. What follows, then, is a reading of what 1 believe to be one of the 
dominant concerns of these films, and the Wyatt Earp myth general, insofar as it 
functions during the Cold War.
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2. The Significance of Wyatt Earp in American History
The challenge of any study of the Western genre is that the concept of the 
"Western" is manifold and mercurial. As Philip French has eloquently written.
The Western is a great grab bag, a hungry cuckoo of a genre, a 
voracious bastard of a form, open equally to visionaries and 
opportunists, ready to seize anything that's in the thin air from 
juvenile delinquency to ecology. (24)
Thus, the problem for the scholar who seeks to explore the genre is how to best 
approach this "hungry cuckoo" that is capable of ingesting such a variety of themes 
and subjects. One cannot attempt to examine the entire body of Western film and 
expect to arrive at a singular conclusion. Instead, it is preferable to identify a 
particular trait, plot device, or character and explore how the single item functions 
within the genre. In this manner, it becomes possible to see general trends in the 
treatment of Western subjects that may be elusive with other methods of limiting 
sources. For example. Will Wright's examination of the genre in Six Guns and Society 
that includes only those Westerns that topped the box office during his period of 
focus is problematic for many analytical purposes.^ One issue that arises from 
W right's selection is the fact that what contributed to a film's popularity is often 
difficult to locate and, indeed, may be located outside of the film text itself. As 
Coyne points out in his discussion of Wright's method, "One always needs to be
However, his delineation is appropriate for his own study.
2 0
aware of the possibility that a very high popularity may reflect the influences of 
factors which are not necessarily a result of the genre itself" (8). While Wright 
argues that the films he examines were popular because they articulated certain 
mythical elements that their audience craved, he ignores the existence of the 
Hollywood star system and differences in marketing between films. Additionally, 
an approach such as Wright's forces the scholar to ask only why a film is popular, 
without addressing why another is not. In contrast, employing an approach to the 
genre that examines a particular aspect of the genre provides the scholar with a 
fixed variable that may be examined diachronically in light of issues related to 
context, filmography, or any other approach that the scholar believes will be 
illuminating.
With this in mind, I will continue my examination of the use of the Western 
as a cultural forum through the analysis of one figure — Wyatt Earp — and his role in 
the event that has contributed most to his infamy: the so-called "Gunfight at the 
O.K. Corral." The story of Wyatt Earp and the gunfight has been translated to film 
many times, but it gained particular currency with American audiences in the years 
after World War II. Wyatt was an ideal locus for the cultural forum because, above 
all, he embodied conflict. Through Wyatt Earp, multiple conflicting ideologies and 
discourses could be projected onto the screen, permitting the audiences to 
simultaneously engage in the bad faith narrative of American Progressivism and 
"uplifting" colonialism while encountering troubling issues of authority and 
morality. Specifically, I will examine the way Wyatt Earp fulfills this role in five
2 1
films: M y Darling Clementine (1946); Gunfight at the O.K. Corral (1957); Hour of the Gun 
(1967); Doc (1971); and Tombstone (1993)d A study of these films will not only trace 
the mercurial nature of fictional translations of a historical figure, but will also 
provide insight into shifting American attitudes toward the nation's role in the 
world, particularly in regard to imperialism and colonialism.
Wyatt Earp is a figure in the Western mythological pantheon^ that is 
particularly resonant in American culture. His legend has become indelibly etched 
into American popular memory, in spite of the fact that over one hundred years 
have passed since he undertook his most famous exploits. The story of his career 
and references to it still manifest themselves throughout American culture, 
sometimes in unexpected places: people still talk about "getting out of Dodge"; an 
episode of the television series The Simpsons features a car lot named the "O.K. Car­
rai"; and foreign officials have criticized the United States for exhibiting a "Wyatt 
Earp attitude" in foreign relations (Barra, Inventing 6). Earp has also appeared in 
video games —Tombstone 1882 (2003) offers a player the opportunity to "claim [his or 
her] fortune in the boomtown of Tombstone as part of the Earps or Clantons" — as 
well as in novels, comic books, and, of course, films. A cursory search on the
4 Conspicuous by its absence is Wyatt Earp (1994). 1 have consciously omitted this 
film from my study as its plot subordinates the Gunfight at the OK Corral and the 
vendetta ride to being mere chapters in the larger story of Wyatt's life. The other 
films in my study all center either on the Gunfight or its aftermath; by shifting its 
focus, Wyatt Earp develops a different intertextual resonance that eliminates the 
polarized ideological conflict that is of utmost significance in the other films and to 
the Cold War.
5 By "Western mythological pantheon," I mean simply figures from American 
frontier history who are better known for the deeds and characterizations attributed 
to them through fiction than for their historical reality.
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Internet Movie Database yields twenty-nine films that feature a character named 
"Wyatt Earp," and these results do not include the countless characters that have 
been inspired by his legend or films that have borrowed plots from Wyatt's life and 
legend. As Allen Barra argues, "the streetfight in Tombstone touched something in 
America's collective unconscious. Whenever showdowns or confrontations are 
thought to be epic, Americans will always refer to the Gunfight at the O.K. Corral" 
{Inventing 398).
Clearly, Wyatt Earp's story is important to American culture. However, there 
is no consistent portrayal of Wyatt Earp. In one film Wyatt may be an American 
Western incarnation of a noble cavalier, righting injustices and winning the love of 
the fair schoolmarm. In others he may be quite the opposite, possessing qualities 
that qualify him as little more than a bully. The contrasts between some portrayals 
is striking; one need only compare the upright, moralistic Wyatt in My Darling 
Clementine to the sadistic madman in Doc to wonder if the films are based on the 
same historical figure. However, this adaptability and malleability is, in fact, 
possibly the most accurate part of any portrayal of Wyatt Earp.
Nineteenth-century accounts of Wyatt Earp are equally antithetical as later 
adaptations of his story. From very early on, accounts of Wyatt's life were coloured 
by partisan rhetoric. The most readily apparent examples are contemporary 
newspaper accounts of "gunfight at the O.K Corral," or, as it was known prior to the 
release of the film of that name, the gunfight in the streets of Tombstone. The shoot­
out, which pitted Wyatt, his brothers Virgil and Morgan, and his friend John Henry
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"Doc" Holliday against Ike and Billy Clanton, Tom and Frank McLaury, and Billy 
Claiborne, left three—all from the Clanton side —dead, and only Wyatt walked away 
untouched by gunfire.
The coverage of the event by the Tombstone newspapers could not have been 
more polarized. The Tombstone Epitaph sided with the Earps and Doc Holliday. Not 
long after the shootout, John Clum, editor of the Epitaph, wrote that
the feeling among the best class of our citizens is that the Marshal 
[Virgil Earp] was entirely justified in his efforts to disarm these men, 
and that being fired upon they had to defend themselves, which they 
did most bravely. So long as our peace officers make effort to preserve 
the peace and put down highway robbery—which the Earp brothers 
have done, having engaged in the pursuit and capture, where capture 
[has] been made, of every gang of stage robbers in the country — they 
will have the support of all good citizens, (qtd. in Tefertiller 125).
The Daily Nugget, meanwhile, noted the overwhelming turnout for the funerals of 
Billy Clanton and the McLaury brothers, reporting that it was "the largest [funeral] 
ever witnessed in Tombstone" (qtd. in Tefertiller 126). Indeed, the funeral was 
considerable enough to prompt Tombstone resident Clara Brown to write that "a 
stranger . . .  would have thought that some person esteemed by the entire camp was 
being conveyed to his final resting place" (qtd. in Tefertiller 126). In the aftermath of 
the gunfight and funeral, the discrepancies between various reports of the gunfight 
became increasingly stark. On November 3,1881, the Arizona Star painted the
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gunfight as a clear-cut case of murder, suggesting that "it is claimed by many that 
the killing of the McLowrys [sic] and Clanton was cold-blooded and premeditated" 
and corroborating the claim by reporting that "when the shooting occurred the boys 
who were killed were preparing to leave Tombstone; two of them were unarmed 
and . . .  showed no disposition whatever to quarrel or create a public disturbance" 
(qtd. in Tefertiller 132). After the Earps and Holliday were put on trial and 
ultimately vindicated by Judge Wells Spicer, who attested that he could "attach no 
criminality" to the Earps' actions (qtd. in Tefertiller 52), Spicer was discredited by 
various parties and rumours of judicial bias turned public opinion against the Earps 
(Tefertiller 157).
The apparent cause of these conflicting accounts is political and personal 
partisanship. Richard Maxwell Brown argues that "In Cochise County, the 
incorporating trend was spearheaded by a Tombstone faction of mining industry 
entrepreneurs and engineers and their allies among the town's business and 
professional elite. Resisting them were the 'Cowboys' of rural Cochise County. 
Among the members of the incorporating faction was Wyatt Earp" (66). Tombstone 
was a town deeply divided along ideological lines, and the newspapers were no 
better. The two newspapers — the Epitaph and the Daily Nugget—ie\l on either side of 
the gulf between the county's Republicans and Democrats. The Epitaph was the 
Republican voice in Tombstone, and so favoured the Earps' side in the conflict. 
Furthermore, editor John Clum was a personal friend of Wyatt. The Daily Nugget, 
on the other hand, was aligned with the Democrats and carried some grudge against
25
the Earp family, possibly arising from Wyatt's political struggles against Democrat 
John Behan over the Cochise County sheriff's office.
Other available primary sources relating to the conflict are equally 
problematic. George Parson's diary, an invaluable source of information on daily 
life in Tombstone, is coloured by Parson's friendship and obvious allegiance to 
Wyatt Earp. Other accounts of the feud, however, are no more reliable; those 
involved in the conflict had long memories, and even decades after the gunfight 
they had strong emotional reactions to the parties involved. Frank Waters' account 
of the events, which he claimed he had based on conversations with Virgil Earp's 
wife Allie, clearly project Allie Earp's dislike of her brother-in-law, to the point that 
Allen Barra was compelled to wryly suggest that Waters' book I Married Virgil Earp 
would have been more aptly titled I Married Virgil Earp — But I hated Wyatt Even More 
than I Loved Virgil (Inventing 234). Of course, the book that is supposedly based on 
Wyatt's own statements is no better. Stuart M. Lake's Wyatt Earp: Frontier Marshal is 
a lionizing biography of Wyatt and positions its subject in mythic terms, to the 
extent that Lake bestows upon Wyatt his own Excalibur — the "Buntline Special," a 
Colt Revolver with an extended twelve-inch barrel. Lake later admitted that the 
material in the book that he originally claimed was based on a series of interviews 
he conducted with Wyatt was largely fabricated, but it was too late: Frontier Marshal 
had become the biography that would have the greatest influence on Earp scholars 
and filmmakers. Subsequent Earp debunkers all respond to Lake's adulatory text on
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some level, and for many the biography has become the worst kind of fiction- 
masquer ading-as-history.
Perhaps as a result, subsequent historiography that deals with Wyatt Earp 
has fared no better. All historians who wish to study Wyatt are forced to work in 
the shadow of these questionable primary sources. Working with accounts like 
those published in the Epitaph, the Daily Nugget, Frontier Marshal and I Married Wyatt 
Earp, it is no surprise that few serious academic biographies of Wyatt Earp of any 
notable quality have emerged. Rather, the majority of the available biographies fall 
victim to the polarization of the primary sources. Even those that are well 
researched and capably argued must deal with the conundrum of these conflicting 
and often completely contradictory reports and assess how best to deal with them.
If there is any privileging of one source over another, a particular image of Wyatt 
Earp may emerge that is a far cry from the complexities of the actual man and the 
events in which he actually participated.
Still, by analyzing such conflicting accounts and considering the sources of 
such disputes, it is possible to glean from the historical evidence some information 
that will be useful for a study of explicitly fictional accounts of Wyatt Earp. Richard 
Maxwell Brown has examined the conflict in Tombstone as a struggle between 
forces of urban incorporation, represented by Earp and his Republican allies, and 
rural pastoralism, represented by the Democratic 'Cowboys' (69). Earp, "as a 
Northerner reared in a Unionist family . .. reflected and adhered to the social ideal 
of the Republican party in Gilded-Age America: an allegiance to conservative values
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and enterprising capitalism" (Brown 66). Brown identifies Wyatt as a "glorified 
gunfighter," one of those "historically significant figures" who "were violent 
protagonists in the great social, economic, and cultural conflicts that rocked the West 
in the late nineteenth century" (40). Brown's glorified gunfighters were often 
"strongly partisan" and were "players in a social drama in which conservative 
forces consolidated authority in the West in the interest of property, order, and law" 
(40). The divide between the Republicans and the Democrats was exacerbated by 
the economic stratification in the county. Brown goes on to argue that the gunfight 
in the streets of Tombstone was an "outgrowth of the highly conflicted social, 
economic, and political situation in Cochise County and its county seat. Tombstone" 
(67).
Wyatt Earp's significance to American popular culture in the years following 
World War II is appropriate, then, given his status as a figure for incorporation and 
capitalism. Stanley Corkin has argued that after World War II
the United States needed to expand its economy endlessly, constantly 
incorporating more nations into the global system. If we look back to 
the late nineteenth century we can see roots of this strategy in the 
westward expansion of the nation; in short, Arizona in the late 
nineteenth century played a role in the U.S. national economy similar 
to that played by Saudi Arabia in the mid twentieth century. (37)
Both regions are peripheral to the seat of power, but offer the potential for great 
economic growth through the mining of silver, in Arizona's case, or through the
28
drilling oil in the Middle East. American interests sought to secure and incorporate 
both regions in order to achieve greater financial security. Thus, Corkin clearly 
draws a link between the historical Wyatt Earp and the American situation in the 
early years of the Cold War, explaining at least in part the repeated usage of the 
figure. Corkin's argument suggests that American audiences created a link between 
the conflict in Cochise County and American involvement abroad, and, as a result, 
Wyatt Earp films were reflective of the international stage. Wyatt represented 
America; in viewing him on screen, the audience was taking part in a triumphal 
narrative about the spread of American capital abroad. Luhr, meanwhile, has 
emphasized issues of class in the Earp narratives: "The Earp-Clanton conflict often 
takes on the iconographie coloring of a class war, with the Earp faction represented 
as four dignified men in frock coats and the Clantons as a roughly dressed, surly 
mob gathered in a dark cabin by their malevolent old father" (39).
Luhr has also noted that Wyatt Earp "represents a certain phase in the 
development of the frontier hero," noting a shift in the structure of the genre that is 
typified in the Wyatt Earp narrative: "Prior to [Wyatt Earp] and his type, many 
American frontier heroes drew a significant part of their identity from their relations 
with other races" (39). With the dawn of the Cold War, the essential binarism of the 
Western hero and villain shifted from being one of race to one of ideology. The 
dichotomy was not drawn between Euro-American /  Indian any longer but rather 
between capitalist /  socialist. Cohen adds, "With the emergence of the Iron Curtain
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as part of international discourse, [Wyatt] had come to represent the Cold Warriors 
who held the line against the enemies of democracy" (207).
However, as Cohen has argued, "for those in our society who reject 
government action that interferes with individual freedom, the symbolism of what 
happened is different. They see the law enforcers not as representatives of the 
public good, but as oppressors" (205). For this segment of the audience, the Earp 
films offered a tale that was not adulatory of the American nation but instead 
presented its faults. Luhr notes the shifting depiction of Wyatt and his friends, 
commenting that by the 1970s, "Earp's suit and the Clanton's rough work clothes 
made him less appealing and them less repulsive, at least to counterculture 
sympathizers" (40).
Clearly there are multiple available readings of the Wyatt Earp story. As 
Cohen suggests, "That the gunfight at the O.K. Corral can embody such opposing 
views goes a long way in explaining why the incident remains a vital presence" 
(204). The gunfight behind the OK Corral was itself a conflict of ideologies, between 
the Democratic values of the Cowboys and the Republican aims of the Earps and 
their allies. Cohen argues that "the seeming clarity of the shoot-out at the O.K. 
Corral has become a ready and justifying symbol, notably in the government 
quashing threats to law and order" (204 -  5). But it is far too simplistic to say that 
Wyatt Earp only represented forces of incorporation and progressivism while the 
Cowboys were a catch-all group for Communists, counterculturists, or anti-
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capitalists. The Wyatt Earp story is much more complicated than the black and 
white issue painted by Cohen and others.
Indeed, Wyatt Earp himself was not simply a Republican businessman. 
Richard Maxwell Brown identifies a conflict within Earp between his status as a 
conservative and his role as a "rounder" (67) who enjoyed gambling, drinking, and 
other Western saloon-fare. These characteristics were opposed by his Republican 
desire to consolidate towns into the American capitalist system. Wyatt himself is a 
conflicted character who does not fully subscribe to a single ideology. Furthermore, 
Wyatt's role as the idealized lawman is compromised by his "vendetta ride," 
W yatt's campaign after the O.K. Corral to eliminate the whole of the cowboy gang, 
whom he blamed for the death of his younger brother Morgan and the maiming of 
his elder brother, Virgil. Though the vendetta ride is rarely depicted in film —Hour 
of the Gun was the first to do so—the intertextual connection between the filmic 
Wyatt Earp and the historical Wyatt Earp necessarily alludes not only to the 
integration of Tombstone into American commerce through the "just war" that 
resulted in the gunfight behind the O.K. Corral, but also the aftermath of that event, 
in which Wyatt's power and authority were pushed to excess in the name of 
personal vengeance.
Finally, the conclusion that Wyatt Earp represents a positive good in 
American culture, even in the 1940s and 1950s, is complicated by the fact that Wyatt 
is the agent through whom the rural ideal will be destroyed. While the Western 
certainly suggests the myth of progressivism—that the incorporation and eventual
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industrialization of the town and its growth into the city is an improvement—the 
genre is ultimately akin to Leo Marx's conception of the American pastoral. The 
Western champions economic expansion while simultaneously elegizing the way of 
life that it is replacing. Part and parcel of this is the sense that the older way of life 
that Wyatt Earp is replacing is, in fact, better than the one he heralds in. In the 
Western, the incorporation of the town represents not only an influx of capital, but 
also the death of an age of heroism (REF —Brown?). The archetypal gunfighter hero 
rarely stays in the town he has civilized as there is no further need for his heroism; 
Wyatt Earp is no exception.
Ultimately, the story of Wyatt Earp, whether historical or fictional, is one of 
conflict. Initially there is the ideological conflict between the Republican Earp and 
the Democratic Cowboys, as well as Wyatt Earp's internal struggle between his 
"rounder" inclinations and his drive to be a successful businessman. There is the 
additional conflict between the rule of law as represented by the supposedly "good" 
war that should have ended behind the O.K. Corral and the one that did not, but 
culminated in Wyatt Earp's "vendetta ride." Finally, there is the schism between the 
competing ideals of American progressivism and the American concept of the 
idealized frontier. These competing ideologies are all essential to the story of Wyatt 
Earp in any of its incarnations, and, indeed, are the source of its endurance and 
popularity. The story of Tombstone and Wyatt Earp presents its audience with an 
ideal cultural forum to explore these competing ideologies: the audience is able to 
participate in the pleasing, triumphal narrative of the progression of American
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capitalism while engaging in their guilt regarding what is lost in its name. 
Additionally, the legend of Tombstone offers special significance to an American 
audience in the Cold War. Tombstone's embroilment in a war of ideology where 
class distinctions were paramount bore striking familiarity for Americans who were 
being faced with an Iron Curtain and a divided world. Tombstone offered them not 
only a location upon which to focus their anxiety regarding the direction of America 
at a time of renewed economic prosperity but also a forum in which their fears 
regarding power, violence, and authority could be set into discourse with one 
another.
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3. Red Dawn: My Darling Clementine, Gunfight at the O.K.
Corral, and the Anxiety of Influence
The first two Wyatt Earp films to appear during the Cold War were My 
Darling Clementine and Hour of the Gun. Both of these films were major prestige 
pictures for their respective studios, and each featured a number of major 
Hollywood stars of the time. More significantly, both My Darling Clementine and 
Gunfight at the OK Corral depict a version of Wyatt Earp that is overwhelmingly 
positive. The Wyatt Earp in these films is most akin to the marshal from Stuart 
Lake's book and embodies the Western lawman ideal: he is honest, honourable, and 
seeks to dispel the agents of chaos from Tombstone in order to make the town safe 
for the people who live there. However, in spite of these idealistic depictions of 
Wyatt Earp, both films contain subtle but significant undercurrents that undermine 
the triumphal surface narrative. While there is undoubtedly a triumphal aspect to 
both of these films that sanctifies and glorifies the United States' position in the post­
war order, both stories develop a discourse of anxiety regarding the very same 
subject. In the case of My Darling Clementine, the overt narrative that suggests the 
foundation of a community made safe by Wyatt Earp is tempered by a contradictory 
narrative that betrays an overwhelming discomfort with the obligations of power 
and the abandonment of isolationism. In Gunfight at the O.K. Corral, the impetus for 
the social anxiety has shifted focus to examine the means of such power, meditating
34
on the contemporary foreign policy discourses of containment, massive retaliation 
and Eisenhower's "New Look" diplomacy.
At the time of the release of John Ford's My Darling Clementine in December 
1946, the American public was in the throes of a dramatic shift in its government's 
approach to foreign policy. In spite of movements toward internationalism prior to 
World War 1 with the establishment of the Samoan protectorate, annexation of 
Hawaii, possession of the Philippines, and the Roosevelt Corollary, the inter-war 
years had been, for the United States, a period of what historian William G. Carleton 
termed "pathological isolation" (18). With World War II, such isolationism no 
longer seemed possible for the United States. The war had precipitated American 
involvement in world affairs even prior to America's entry into the actual fighting: 
the nation had expanded its navy, loaned money to China, placed embargoes on 
steel and iron not destined for Britain or the Western hemisphere, and enacted the 
Lend-Lease Act. American involvement deepened significantly with the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor. Soon the United States took a lead role in wartime decision­
making and adopted the goal of shaping the "ideological world of the future" 
through international cooperation (Carleton 38). Even with the Axis defeated, there 
was small chance that the United States would be able to return to insularity. The 
balance of power system, which had long shielded the United States from the 
necessity of taking an active role in international issues, had been drastically altered, 
with the United States occupying a much more significant position (Almond 13); 
additionally, military technology developed in the early 1940s —particularly the
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atomic bom b—had "transformed war from a limited to an unlimited risk" (Almond 
14).
In spite of the United States' ascendancy and decisive role in the victory over 
the Axis, such a shift in the world order did not result in the optimism and 
confidence commonly attributed to the 1950s by popular culture. Rather, the 
opposite was true. Carleton notes that this "revolution in foreign policy" was 
"difficult for most Americans to grasp" (90). Involvement in world affairs to such a 
degree was a marked sea change for an American public that had been fed the 
rhetoric of the interwar years that promoted isolationism. For years, Americans had 
been told that involvement in organizations such as the League of Nations would 
result in the United States' hand being forced to inserting itself in obligations that 
served no interest of America. Now, the nation was in a position where it was, by 
virtue of the postwar power structure, a part of most international negotiations, 
without an option to extract itself.
However, Americans were further troubled by the enigmatic role of the 
Soviet Union in the world's power structure (Carleton 44). Though the nations were 
still technically allies, the Soviet Union was a nation with very different values than 
the United States. Furthermore, Russia had a considerable force left in Eastern 
Europe at the end of the war. To make matters worst, in the rest of Europe, 
collectivism and Communism were catching on in more and more countries in the 
face of postwar economic uncertainty — even the old powers of Britain and France.
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In Britain, the Labour Party rose to power, while the French government 
nationalized a number of utilities.
In the years immediately following World War 11, an increasing number of 
conflicts began to arise between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United 
States was troubled by the Soviet Union's failure to participate in United Nations- 
m andated programs such as UNESCO and the trusteeship system, and was 
additionally concerned by Russia's use of its Security Council veto over the Iran 
dispute in 1946. Atomic weapons were another sticking point between the powers; 
as long as the United States was the sole possessor of nuclear weapons in the world, 
the Soviet Union argued passionately for the destruction and ban of all atomic 
armaments. The United States, meanwhile, supported the Baruch Plan to create an 
independent body that would have control over all world nuclear supplies as well 
as the mining of uranium and plutonium (Carleton 131). The events in Korea in 
1945 and 1946 also contributed to a sense of anxiety. At the end of 1945, the United 
States and the Soviet Union had agreed to put Korea under provisional trusteeship, 
controlled by a joint effort of these two nations as well as Britain and Nationalist 
China. The Korean Communists had accepted this proposal, but the United States 
balked, instead proposing free elections. The two nations could not agree on what 
should be done. After the United States proposed free elections, Russia went before 
the United Nations to request the withdrawal of all troops, a proposal that the 
United States feared would lead to civil war.
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During this period, the suspicious attitude toward Communism entered the 
public discourse more and more frequently. The Truman Administration's foreign 
policy toward the Soviet Union was a major issue of the midterm elections in 1946. 
Republican politicians, led by John Foster Dulles, focused their rhetoric on accusing 
Truman of being "soft on communism." On October 25 1945, Republican candidates 
Karl Mundt and Francis Bolton wrote that the president was "lacking on the side of 
firmness" (qtd. in Woods and Jones 100) and called for a more confrontational stance 
toward the Soviets. A December 1945 proposal of a loan to Britain was met with 
clamorous opposition; Republican Jesse Sumner accused the Administration of 
advancing the cause of socialism in Britain by funding the "Labour Party's social 
experiments" (Woods and Jones 122). By March 1946, polls were reporting that 
seventy-one percent of Americans were opposed to Soviet foreign affairs policies, 
while sixty percent believed that the United States was too soft on Russia (Woods 
and Jones 117). Perhaps more strikingly, another poll, conducted by the American 
Institute of Public Opinion the National Opinion Research Center, found that 
between March 1945 and September 1946, the percentage of Americans anticipating 
the United States to be at war within the next twenty-five years ballooned from 
thirty-eight percent to sixty-two percent (Almond 90). In March 1946, the number of 
people expecting war within ten years sat at forty-nine percent. In July 1946, Fortune 
reported that fifty percent of a national sample believed that Russia was out to 
dominate the world (Almond 95), a position echoed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who
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believed that the Soviets had "a commitment to world revolution and a renewed 
determination to undermine capitalism" (Woods and Jones 128).
With such alarmism so prevalent in the national discourse, it should not be 
surprising that similar anxieties manifested themselves in cultural productions of 
the time. Yet, most critics who have analyzed films like My Darling Clementine have 
instead focused on the film's triumphal quality. Stanley Corkin, Richard Slotkin, 
and others have focused their analyses on the ways in which My Darling Clementine 
champions and mythologizes the United States' new role in the world. However, 
such a reading is confounded by the film's sub-textual acknowledgment of the 
worrisome aspects of this role. In particular, these readings have emphasized My 
Darling Clementine as a story about the arrival of "civilization" in Tombstone. I will 
argue, however, that instead of Wyatt Earp integrating Tombstone into the Eastern 
order, it is rather Tombstone that integrates Wyatt Earp into its already extant order. 
Thus, My Darling Clementine offers a narrative that allegorizes the United States' 
entry onto the world stage, replete with the anxieties that this circumstance entails. 
This is not to say that the triumphalist readings of My Darling Clementine are invalid; 
instead, the competing available readings are complementary, each contributing to 
the film's function as a cultural forum.
Stanley Gorkin's position on My Darling Clementine emphasizes American 
foreign policy's turn toward economic imperialism. Corkin argues that after World 
War II, American policy ceased to be defined "simply by the goal of occupying 
contiguous lands but also by the imperative of reordering them according to a
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distinctly U.S. vision of society" (10). The goal of such endeavours was not to 
merely access the resources of other nations and regions but also to ideologically 
convert their inhabitants to the American way of life, thus creating an optimal 
location for trade relations. Corkin argues that "Westerns played some role in this 
cultural shift as they reflected it. [Westerns] articulated the necessity of engaged 
heroes who morally ensure the role of right" (10). This assertion provides the basis 
for Gorkin's ultimate argument that Westerns in the early Cold War period — 
including My Darling Clementine —are parables of the spread of American values and 
ideologies, a dissemination that ultimately results in the creation of new free 
markets for American commerce. However, Gorkin's argument that these films are 
unabashed exhortations for the spread of American capitalism assumes that such 
discourses are rendered unproblematically. While Gorkin's reading of the texts is 
certainly valid and indeed may be the most readily available close reading of the 
film, his interpretation glosses over several important aspects.
John Ford's My Darling Clementine was the first Wyatt Earp film to appear in 
the wake of World War II. The film was a prestige picture, and Ford cast 
Hollywood star Henry Fonda, who had previously portrayed American folk heroes 
Abraham Lincoln and Tom Joad, in the role of Wyatt Earp. My Darling Clementine is 
loosely based on Stuart Lake's Wyatt Earp: Frontier Marshal, but departs drastically 
from that text. An additional source of Ford's version of the Wyatt Earp myth was 
Wyatt Earp himself; Ford claimed to have met Earp during Earp's time in 
Hollywood and the director based his version of the climactic gunfight on Earp's
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own account of the event. The film followed a general trend that had developed in 
Ford's filmmaking whereby the director "often used the rural community to act as a 
microcosm embodying the tradition and the plain moral values of the pioneering life 
in nineteenth-century America" (Bohnke 48). Corkin notes that
Ford was apparently drawn to seize the opportunity that the [Western] 
genre afforded for social commentary that did not necessarily fall 
distinctly into categories of left and right. That is, Westerns allowed 
the politically complex director to explore ideas that more 
contemporary plots would have made politically controversial. (17)
It is likely, however, that Ford himself would have likely vehemently denied that 
any such decision consciously took place, as he had been cited by those who knew 
him, including some of the cast and crew of My Darling Clementine, as being resistant 
to interpretations of his films as anything more than just films.
In spite of Ford's expected protests. My Darling Clementine is most frequently 
read as an apology for American progressivism that champions the United States' 
new role as a world super power. In this reading Tombstone is a synecdoche for the 
world, and Wyatt Earp for America; his expulsion of Tombstone's undesirable 
elements is analogous to the United States freeing the world from undemocratic and 
anti-capitalist elements. In Gunfighter Nation, Richard Slotkin argues that My Darling 
Clementine is a classic example of the town-tamer Western in which "social injustice 
is imposed by powerful criminals; the hero must defeat them and thus empower the 
'decent folks' who bring progress to the Frontier" (379).
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Stanley Gorkin's convincing reading of M y Darling Clementine in Cowboys as 
Cold Warriors is perhaps the most exemplary instance of the progressive reading of 
the film. According to Corkin, M y Darling Clementine "[tells] of the moment when 
the peripheral territories that either were or about to become a part of the political 
sphere of the United States actively embrace their destiny" (32). Corkin adds that 
the film encourages "a view of the United States that allows for acts of empire or 
hegemony to be seen as the expression of a rational and moral imperative that will 
ensure progress and promote the development of civilization" (29). Corkin also 
suggests that My Darling Clementine serves a purpose similar to what Richard 
Slotkin details in Gunfighter Nation, whereby the Western film uses a mythic past to 
lend mythic resonance to contemporary events, allowing the audience to 
comprehend and justify events that may otherwise be considered extreme, alarming, 
or even confusing:
When considered within [its] historical context as [an early version] of 
the postwar Western, [My Darling Clementine] articulate[s] a means of 
understanding the phenomenon of general assent to the extremes of 
Cold War ideology and government policy. (28)
Corkin especially emphasizes the economic aspects of this reading; as previously 
mentioned, he connects the American necessity to continually expand its economic 
influence with westward expansion and identifies continuity between frontier 
Arizona and the oil-rich nations of the Middle East in the twentieth century. Thus, 
for Slotkin and Corkin and most other critics who have examined My Darling
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Clementine, the film is a triumphal narrative communicating and justifying to its 
audience the necessity of American imperialism by portraying such hegemony in 
abstraction, allegorizing American economic expansion through a narrative 
featuring a legendary national hero.
This allegorical reading is undoubtedly convincing. Indeed, M y Darling 
Clementine does function as a narrative that celebrates the ascendant American state 
and its global economic and political power. However, a close reading of the film 
reveals an alternate counter-discourse that undermines a reading of My Darling 
Clementine as a laudatory narrative. A number of aspects of the text instead suggest 
the anxiety that dominated political discourse of the time. Primary among these is 
the fact that Wyatt Earp does little to integrate Tombstone into the eastern 
"civilized" order; the town appears to be attaining this stage on its own. Rather, it is 
Wyatt Earp who becomes integrated into Tombstone's social order.
Initially, My Darling Clementine establishes a clear connection to the American 
public anxiety that the nation's new role as a super power will involve it in conflicts 
that may bear no relation to the interests of the United States. In the film, Wyatt 
Earp and his brothers are drawn into a feud with the Clanton family by pure 
happenstance: the Earps are passing near Tombstone with their herd of cattle and 
encounter Old Man Clanton and his sons, who offer to buy the cattle. Wyatt Earp 
refuses, and that evening visits Tombstone with his brothers Morgan and Virgil, 
leaving young James behind to watch over the herd. Wyatt Earp is almost 
immediately draw n into a conflict that he has no interest in: his visit to the
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barbershop is interrupted by shooting and shouting from a nearby saloon, where a 
drunken man is causing trouble. When the marshal refuses to intervene because he 
is not paid enough, Wyatt Earp feels morally obligated to put himself in danger to 
deal with the problem. After Wyatt expels the drunkard Charlie from the saloon 
and chastises the town for "selling liquor to Indians" he is asked to accept the now- 
vacant position of marshal. Wyatt refuses and returns to his camp to find that his 
cattle have been rustled and his brother James has been shot in the back. At this 
point, Wyatt accepts the position of marshal and assigns Morgan and Virgil as 
deputies in order to avenge his brother's death. The Clanton family is, of course, 
behind James' murder.
These events emphasize the obligations that power carries with it. Wyatt 
Earp has no interest in becoming involved in Tombstone's troubles, but he is forced 
into battle simply due to his presence in Tombstone. If Tombstone is indeed a 
microcosm for the world and Wyatt Earp a synecdoche for America, Wyatt Earp's 
arrival in Tombstone is a symbol for the United States' entry into world politics from 
its interwar period of isolation. Significantly, Wyatt Earp is forced into his 
involvement in Tombstone's local affairs. His economic strength—represented by 
his herd of cattle —makes him a target for the "undesirable elements" of Tombstone 
in the form of the Clanton gang. He is a victim of his own power. Following this 
initial problem, he is further pulled into Tombstone's world through the inability of 
the existing authority to handle the town's problems, creating an analog with the 
shifting balance of power in the world following World War II. Suddenly, Wyatt is
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the head of a new order in Tombstone and quickly ascends to a position of power 
and influence in Tombstone.
However, Wyatt Earp does not, in fact, bring order to Tombstone. Aside 
from his expulsion of Charlie from the saloon early in the film, there is little to 
suggest that the town is in any sort of trouble. Nor is there any indication that 
integration into the order of the East—or, in Slotkin and Gorkin's terms, the 
American economic order—will benefit the community. In fact, there is a number of 
symbols of civilization in Tombstone already. One of these is the chair that Wyatt 
sits in to have his shave during his first night in Tombstone. The barber proudly 
tells Wyatt Earp that the chair came from Chicago, but admits that he does not know 
how to work it after the chair throws Wyatt onto the floor. This event emphasizes 
that civilization—and commerce — is already present in Tombstone. However, the 
civilization is imperfect. While the barber's admission that he does not know how to 
work the chair implies that Tombstone is the deficient party in the relationship, it is 
nevertheless Wyatt who is expelled from the chair, suggesting an incompatibility 
between Tombstone, Wyatt Earp, and eastern commerce. This tension is developed 
to appeal to the anxiety of the film's American audience, which, while pleased with 
post-war American affluence, is uncertain about the implications of such influence.
A second example of civilization's arrival in Tombstone prior to Wyatt Earp's 
appearance is the presence of the actor Granville Thorndyke. Thorndyke is 
immediately identified as a drunkard as he stumbles in to Doc Holliday's saloon.
He accepts an escort to the Birdcage Theater where a throng of rowdy citizens
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awaits his much-anticipated performance, but still manages to get waylaid by the 
Clanton family who force him to perform under duress until Wyatt Earp and Doc 
Holliday intervene. Nevertheless, Thorndyke is able to recite most of Hamlet's "To 
be or not to be" soliloquy, and when he is unable to remember the words — he claims 
it is because it has been "such a long time" — Doc Holliday completes his 
performance. Thorndyke's characterization as a pompous Shakespearean identifies 
him with British high culture, and, by extension, established civilization. Clearly, 
civilization has already established some presence in Tombstone. Although 
Thorndyke's expression of civilization is hardly ideal —he is unable to complete his 
recitation of what is perhaps the most famous speech in Shakespeare's oeuvre, and 
he is characterized as a drunken buffoon—significantly it is a Tombstone institution. 
Doc Holliday, who is capable of completing the monologue.
The final significant expression of civilization in Tombstone is the foundation 
of the First Church of Tombstone. Though the church is not completed at the close 
of the film, the parishioners are able to celebrate the advent of religion into their 
town. The arrival of Christianity in Tombstone signals its integration into the 
civilized world. However, the creation of the church has little to do with the actions 
of Wyatt Earp. Indeed, the Earps seem oblivious to the existence of any sort of 
religion in Tombstone. Their experience with religion seems limited to camp 
meetings. When the congregation of the First Church of Tombstone parades past en 
route to the site where the church is being constructed, Virgil comments, "If we 
w asn't in this territory, Td swear we were back home on a Sunday morning." His
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brothers agree, but the head of the church group corrects him, insulted by the notion 
that the gathering is a camp meeting. Interestingly, the Earps are identified with a 
folksier, more informal, and more rustic expression of religion than the one the 
Tombstone citizens have built on their own. The Ear p's conception of religion is in 
fact less "civilized" than the one represented by the population of Tombstone.
But, the meeting of the parishioners is not significant only for its contrast 
concerning civilized religion. The meeting of the First Church of Tombstone also 
represents the moment of Wyatt Earp's complete integration into the community of 
Tombstone. After the procession passes by the Earp brothers, Morgan and Virgil 
speculate that they should go visit James' grave. Wyatt agrees, but as he is waiting 
for his brothers, he is approached by Clementine Carter, who asks him if he will 
accompany her to the church service. Wyatt's agreement represents his conscious 
decision to forsake his past life and fiis family in favour of greater integration into 
the community of Tombstone: he has rejected his brothers and his past in favour of 
participating in a community foundation event. Furthermore, it is Tombstone that 
must accept Wyatt, not Wyatt who must accept Tombstone. Tfiis acceptance is best 
symbolized by his dance with Clementine: as they dance, the church leader calls on 
the congregation to "Make room for the marshal and his girl." The parishioners 
move aside and form a circle around Wyatt and Clementine, signaling their ultimate 
adoption by the community of Tombstone. Wyatt's decision to participate in the 
community rather than attending to his familial obligation is but the final step in a 
larger process in the narrative of My Darling Clementine. Wyatt is morally obligated
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to enter the community through the violence of the Clanton family, but ultimately 
elects to maintain his presence there by choice. Indeed, the plotline featuring his 
vengeance is all but abandoned for most of the film, shifting instead to the 
relationships between Wyatt, Doc, and Clementine.
However, the community that Wyatt has entered is not perfect. Eventually 
he must deal with the Clanton family, and he does, at the cost of another brother's 
life. The world that Wyatt has become integrated into is a violent one, and is further 
complicated by the presence of Doc Holliday in Tombstone. Doc Holliday is, if 
anything, an even better representative of civilization than the Earp brothers. While 
Ford has, in My Darling Clementine, ignored the Earps' northern upbringing, he 
deliberately shifts Doc Holliday's origin from the aristocratic south to Boston, 
Massachusetts. Boston's history and role in the American Revolution creates an 
additional analogue between Holliday and the United States as an ideal. Yet, 
Holliday has all but rejected civilization, leaving the nurse and schoolmarm 
Clementine for the Mexican dance hall girl Chihuahua and, at one point, smashing 
his medical diploma with a bottle and derisively scoffing at his former name, 
"Doctor John Holliday." Holliday's presence seems to suggest that the "civilization" 
that is being brought to Tombstone by the easterners is fractured.
Ultimately, My Darling Clementine recounts not the integration of Tombstone 
into the American system, but instead the integration of the American system into 
Tombstone. Allegorically, the film tells the story of the United States' ascendance to 
power after World War 11. However, this power is not without its perils. Wyatt
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Earp is drawn into battle with the Clanton family, at the cost of two of his brothers. 
The Clantons, ruled by their autocratic patriarch, represent Soviet Russia in relation 
to the Earps' America. My Darling Clementine thus becomes a tale reflecting the 
anxieties of American audiences related to the United States' newfound dominance 
of the balance of power and the obligations that such authority might carry with it. 
For decades, politicians and pundits had told Americans that involvement in 
international organizations like the League of Nations would force the United States' 
hand in foreign affairs, and now the nation found itself in a position where it was 
facing a rival that was being portrayed as an ideological enemy bent on world 
domination. The fear of being drawn into a war, made all the more frightening by 
the existence of atomic weaponry, weighed heavily on American minds as it 
circulated in the discourse of politicians, especially leading up to the midterm 
election of 1946. My Darling Clementine offered a cultural forum reflecting both sides 
of the argument: Wyatt's success against the Clanton family and reciprocated love 
for Clementine support the triumphal reading of Slotkin and Corkin; however, the 
counter-narrative of Wyatt Earp's integration into Tombstone's community 
challenges the progressive allegory. Thus, My Darling Clementine fulfills Robinson's 
bad faith principle by providing a forum wherein such competing discourses are 
offered so that the audience may address its anxieties while being lauded for its 
society's successes.
By the time Gunfight at the O.K. Corral was released in 1957, such anxieties had 
been amplified. Russian rearmament and nuclear capabilities intensified American
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fears that the nation's position of power would compromise national security, with 
the additional threat of incredible destruction as a result of a nuclear war rather than 
conventional war. Moreover, conflicts had been arising across the world that 
seemed to confirm that America's fate was to involve itself in foreign wars that 
seemed to have little direct relevance for Americans living in the United States. The 
rules of war had become blurred. No longer was war fought on a battlefield oceans 
away. Rather, American rhetoricians emphasized an ideological threat that worked 
through "infiltration and intimidation" (NSC-68 VII). The Eisenhower 
administration's "New Look" approach to foreign policy aggravated American 
angst as John Foster Dulles and others advocated a policy of "massive retaliation" — 
a strategy that advocated a massive arms race as a form of deterrence. As the Soviet 
Union developed its own atomic weapons program and worked on perfecting inter­
continental ballistic missiles, the possibility of a nuclear war hitting American soil 
became a very real threat. Gunfight at the O.K. Corral provided a forum wherein 
these fears could be placed in currency with the prevailing discourse of the 
Eisenhower administration, which suggested that a massive build-up of atomic 
armaments was an effective deterrent to the outbreak of nuclear war.
After campaigning against the Democratic Party's perceived "soft" stance 
toward Communism, Eisenhower's Republican administration was obligated to 
adopt a new approach. To this end, the Republicans took the terms of the NSC-68 
and NSC 162/2 documents to heart. NSC-68 articulated a Manichean approach to 
foreign policy: on one side, there was the United States and its allies, and on the
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other, the Soviet bloc (Brands 32). The Soviet Union was characterized by "a new 
fanatic faith, anti-thetical to our own, and seeks to impose its elaborate authority 
over the rest of the world" (NSC-68 1). The document additionally suggested that 
Soviet designs called "for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the 
machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet 
world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and 
controlled from the Kremlin" (NSC-68 111). Furthermore, NSC-68 emphasized the 
Soviet capability to render devastating damage to the United States: "The Kremlin's 
possession of atomic weapons puts new power behind its design, and increases the 
jeopardy to our system" (NSC-68 Vll). As H. W. Brands notes, "For the first time in 
American history, an enemy would possess the capacity to strike quickly and 
devastatingly at America's industrial resources and population. Previous military 
technology had allowed America the luxury of waiting until wars became imminent, 
or had begun, before mobilizing" (33).
NSC 162/2, released in 1953, elaborated on such notions and emphasized the 
purported Soviet plan for world domination. "The basic Soviet objectives," the 
document noted, "continue to be consolidation and expansion of their own sphere of 
power and eventual domination of the non-communist world" (2). NSC 162/2 also 
expressed alarm over the Soviets' recent development of hydrogen weapons and 
conventional military build up: "The USSR has sufficient bombs and aircraft, using 
one-way missions, to inflict serious damage on the United States, especially by 
surprise attack. The USSR soon may have the capability of dealing a crippling blow
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to our industrial base and our continued ability to prosecute a wa r . . . .  Within the 
next two years, the Soviet bloc is not expected to increase the size of its forces, but 
will strengthen them with improved equipment and training and the larger atomic 
stockpile" (2). The National Security Council recommended that, in response, the 
United States develop " [a] strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability 
of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive power" (5). Furthermore, NSC 
162/2 advocated American involvement in nations that were not already aligned 
with the United States, as "their vast manpower, their essential raw materials and 
their potential for growth are such that their absorption within the Soviet system 
would greatly, perhaps decisively, alter the world balance of power to [American] 
detriment" (13). The document continued to speak in economic terms, promoting 
economic growth as a foundation for defense development and security, while 
advocating that the nation "maintain retaliatory power sufficient to insure [sic] 
unacceptable damage to the Soviet system should the USSR resort to general war, 
and prove that the free world can prosper despite Soviet pressures, or if for any 
reason Soviet stability and influence are reduced" (24) and "take feasible political 
economic, propaganda and covert measures designed to create and exploit 
troublesome problems for the USSR" (25).
Though these documents were initially classified, they entered the public 
mind through the rhetoric of several people involved with the Truman and 
Eisenhower administrations, most notably Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles. 
During the 1950 campaign season, Acheson, responding to Republican accusations
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of a weak position toward the Soviets, delivered speeches that emphasized "the 
Soviet enemy as an expansionist imperialist state that relied on 'threats, infiltration, 
planned chaos, despair, and contusion'" (Carey 661), and Neinsweek followed with 
speculation that Congress had been mulling over the option of preventative war. 
Americans responded by indicating their support tor an increased military build-up. 
During the 1950 midterm elections, some seventy percent of respondents in a Gallup 
Poll said that they supported raising taxes to fund the military, leaving the poll 
takers to comment that "Rarely has the Institute in its fifteen years of measuring 
public opinion found such heavy majorities expressing a willingness to pay more 
taxes tor any public purpose" (qtd. in Carey 672).
After the defeat of the Democrats in the 1952 presidential election, the 
Republicans continued their strong anti-Communist rhetoric. In a response to an 
interviewer on April 7,1954, Eisenhower sought to explain the importance of 
Southeast Asia to American interests through an articulation of the "domino 
theory," arguing that the loss of any nations in the region from the American sphere 
of interest would result in a "falling domino principle" (LaFeber 96) that would 
force Japan "toward the Communist areas" tor trade (97). Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles advanced another depiction of the imperialistic machinations of the 
Soviet Union on June 30,1954, in a speech explaining American involvement in 
Guatemala. Dulles suggested that the events in Guatemala "expose[dj the evil 
purpose of the Kremlin to destroy the inter-American system, and [tested] the ability 
of the American states to maintain the peaceful integrity of this hemisphere" (118).
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This speech came six months after Dulles had told a New York audience that 
massive retaliation was the only course of action that could result in peaceful 
liberation from their oppressors. Dulles stated that the President and his advisors 
had agreed "to depend upon a great capacity to retaliate, by means and at places of 
our choosing . . . .  reinforced by the striking power of a strategic air force based on 
internationally agreed positions" (Dulles, "Speech in New York" 169 - 70). The logic 
of the administration, as forwarded by Dulles, was that the threat of such massive 
retaliation would keep the increasingly powerful Soviet state in check.
Thus, the American mind was being bombarded by images of a tyrannical 
enemy that could only be stopped through a massive buildup of arms that, it 
seemed, would inevitably lead to war. John E. Mueller's summary of Cold War 
opinion polls notes that American belief that a third world war was imminent 
peaked with the outbreak of war in Korea, but arose again in the mid 1950s (303).^
In 1955, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology predicted that a 
nuclear war would result in "death and destruction on a scale almost beyond 
knowing and certainly beyond any sensibility to shock and horror that men have so 
far experienced" (qtd. in Brands 65). This dire warning was followed by the 
development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and the realization that were such 
technology also in Soviet hands, the Communists would be able to strike, leaving 
only fifteen minutes warning.
 ^The polls that Mueller cites were discontinued after 1963 and were not conducted 
in 1958 -  59.
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Such was the climate when John Sturges released Gunfight at the O.K. Corral. 
Americans were being bombarded by threats of an expanding enemy that seemed 
bent on their destruction while being told that the only way to deter such an enemy 
was to stockpile weapons with the capability of destruction on an unprecedented 
scale — weapons that their enemies also possessed. This anxiety was coupled with 
the fallout from a sense of paranoia that rose from the McCarthy hearings and Alger 
Hiss trial. Americans were beset from all sides by fear and mistrust. Whether the 
threats were realistic or exaggerated, the mid-1950s developed a culture of fear.
Such disquiet is developed as an alternate allegorical discourse in Gunfight at the 
O.K. Corral. The primary narrative, like My Darling Clementine's, deals with the 
arrival of law in Tombstone in 1882, culminating in the titular battle. However, an 
analysis of sub-textual elements reveals the text's function as a cultural forum where 
the narrative that champions American might is tempered by a fear of 
powerlessness in the face of an enemy that is equipped to render great destruction 
on the nation.
Gorkin's reading of Gunfight at the O.K. Corral in Coiohoys as Cold Warriors 
focuses on the film's discourse of containment. Corkin draws attention to the 
emphasis of borders and lines in Gunfight at the O.K. Corral, such as the "dead line" 
in Dodge City: "In no other Western that I know of is there such an obsession with 
delineating a proper sphere of behavior and influence. In Dodge, guns may not be 
worn above the 'dead line,' a geographical distinction symbolizing the zone of 
anarchy versus that of law and order" (173). Corkin links this to an economic
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reading of Gunfight at the O.K. Corral, suggesting that the threat of the Clantons is not 
to "civilization," as he argued it was in My Darling Clementine, but rather to 
economic ethics. The Clantons are cattle rustlers, but Sturges's Tombstone is a well- 
developed city. The problem with the Clantons, then, is that they are limiting the 
ability of good business people in Tombstone to compete on an even footing with 
the rustlers, representing an illegal infringement on free markets. This circumstance 
is linked to complaints of business interests in the 1950s that manufacturers from 
communist nations used slave labour and ignored copyright law, actions that 
limited the ability of western concerns to compete (167).
Wyatt Earp, Corkin argues, represents American authority in such a world. 
Wyatt's task is to police this region and prevent the spread of influences like the 
Clantons. Corkin notes that Wyatt moves about the west freely with little concern 
for jurisdiction (173); in this light, the entire west becomes a microcosm for the 
world after the Korean War. The various levels of development of the cities Wyatt 
visits, from backwater Griffin, Texas to the relatively cosmopolitan Dodge City, are 
analogous to the various regions in which containment policy would involve the 
United States. As Corkin notes,
[cjontainment did not necessarily mean reining in the nations that 
formed the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. It also meant constraining 
or thwarting nationalist or leftist initiatives all over the world, whether 
in Asia, Western Europe, or Africa. This might take the form of 
thwarting Arab nationalists in the Middle East, countering the
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nonaligned India with a U.S.-supported Pakistan, or infiltrating leftist 
organizations in Western Europe. (168)
Gorkin's reading hinges on his depiction of Wyatt's authority and range as 
being unproblematic. Indeed, there is little in Gunfight at the O.K. Corral to suggest 
that Wyatt's movement is morally or ethically wrong. Nobody questions his 
authority, and he is ready, willing, and able to cross geographic and legal 
boundaries in order to perform his role as a peace officer. Rather, what is troubling 
in Gunfight at the O.K. Corral is the overall ineffectuality of this policy. Ultimately, 
the policy of containment as enacted by Wyatt Earp fails. Ostensibly, in the theatre 
of contemporary politics, the goal of both the containment policy and the New Look 
diplomacy was to prevent an outbreak of war between the Soviet Union and the 
United States. However, Wyatt Earp is unable to prevent a "hot" conflict, as 
represented in the film by the climactic gunfight. The gunfight results not because 
of any deficiency in Wyatt, but rather through the inadequacies of the containment 
system and the alliances that it necessitates. The result is an outbreak of a prolonged 
gun battle, which realizes the fears of Americans who had been inundated with the 
rhetoric of the New Look and massive retaliation.
Throughout Gunfight at the O.K. Corral, Wyatt Earp is loath to utilize violence, 
instead preferring to talk his way out of troublesome situations. He is not a pacifist; 
he will resort to violence when necessary, whether it be "buffaloing" a man with the 
butt of his gun or looking for deputies who can handle a firearm to assist him in the 
apprehension of Luke Short. However, above all, Wyatt Earp prefers to rely on his
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potential for violence to overcome obstacles. This is best illustrated through his 
handling of Shanghai Pierce's invasion of the church social in Dodge City. Despite 
facing overwhelming numbers, Wyatt is able to overcome his foes by targeting their 
leader. Pierce, confident in his superiority, asks Wyatt to shoot it out. Wyatt, 
however, cleverly replies, "Go ahead, but you get it first, Shanghai." In this scene, 
Wyatt succinctly articulates the policy of massive retaliation; though in a long, 
drawn-out war, the United States might not survive, it can, as Dulles put it, "depend 
upon a great capacity to retaliate" (Dulles, "Speech in New York" 169). In this 
instance, the ploy works, thanks in part to Doc Holliday keeping his own gun on the 
mercenary Johnny Ringo, whom Pierce had hired to help him eliminate Earp.
Whenever Wyatt ventures out of the relative safety of his home community of 
Dodge City, however, he is routinely compromised, as Hubert I. Cohen puts it, by 
"misplaced trust" (210). The audience's first encounter with Wyatt is when he is 
learning from his former friend and fellow lawman Cotton Wilson that Ike Clanton 
and Johnny Ringo have been allowed to ride through Griffin, Texas, without being 
held, as Wyatt had asked. Furthermore, in Wyatt's initial meeting with Doc 
Holliday, he is cheated again when he promises Doc information about Ed Bailey in 
exchange for the whereabouts of Clanton and Ringo. Doc accepts Wyatt's 
information but then reminds Wyatt that he never agreed to an exchange. Wyatt's 
inability to rely on other people in the film is perhaps most poignantly expressed 
toward the end of the film when, in a gesture alluding to High Noon, Wyatt casts 
down his badge in disgust. Over time, Wyatt becomes decreasingly confident in his
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abilities. As Cohen has noted, the night before the gunfight at the O.K. Corral his 
calm exterior has been abandoned;
Whereas Ford's Wyatt carries out his revenge with steely resolve, 
Sturges's Wyatt shows his fear the night before the fight. He seeks out 
the unconscious Doc Holliday and pleads, "Doc, wake up. I need you." 
This from the man who heretofore has been unflappable, the epitome 
of justice and law, and who has felt invulnerable. Evidence of the 
latter is shown early in the film when Wyatt walked up to a drunk 
cowboy who had a gun pointed at Wyatt's chest and talked him into 
handing it over. (210-11).
Thus, Wyatt's reliance on deterrence through reputation and alliances with other 
parties has resulted in the collapse of Wyatt's earlier status as the omniscient 
authority. Instead, he is reduced to a mere man like any other, who is now beholden 
to his alliance with Doc Holliday to stay alive.
But Wyatt's alliances, reputation, and tactical skills are not enough to keep 
him out of a battle with the Clantons. While his methods may have worked with 
less significant enemies, from the drunk cowboy Cohen mentions to Shanghai 
Pierce, they fail against the Clantons. Though he is able to talk his way out of tense 
situations with the gang on a number of occasions, they are ultimately spoiling for a 
fight and kill Wyatt's brother James. At this stage, Wyatt abandons any pretense 
that he is fighting for some moral imperative, and, as the Clantons had planned, falls 
into a personal fight. When Doc admonishes him that he is dooming himself by
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fighting Ike Clanton's way, Wyatt retorts, "To hell with logic. That's my brother 
lying there."
Ultimately, Wyatt's strategy of deterrence through his reputation and 
diplomacy fails. As the audience knows from the beginning, the gun battle is 
inevitable. Sturges directs the gunfight so that it is long and draw n out, and strategy 
wins the day. Nevertheless, it is a bloody fight. Virgil Earp is shot in the leg, and 
every Clanton to a man is killed. The epic battle at the end of the film allegorizes the 
outbreak of the hot war that so many Americans feared. The policies of massive 
retaliation and containment failed. Wyatt is unable to scare the Clantons into ceasing 
their transgressions, and he is unable to avoid an armed conflict through force of 
personality alone. Earp wins the day, but it is again at the cost of his brother and, 
possibly. Doc Elolliday, who rose from what may have been his death bed to help 
his friend. In Gunfight at the O.K. Corral, the policies of massive retaliation and 
containment are unable to avoid the inevitable conflict that must arise between the 
two oppositional forces. Wyatt's force of personality only carries him so far.
Thus, both My Darling Clementine and Gunfight at the O.K. Corral present 
triumphal narratives that apparently sanctify America's new role as a superpower.
In My Darling Clementine, Wyatt Earp ostensibly eliminates the undesirable elements 
in Tombstone and makes the town safe for people like Clementine Carter, in an 
allegory about the rise of the American superpower and its potential to combat 
totalitarianism in the world and make the world free for the spread of American 
commerce and progressivism. Eleven years later, Gunfight at the O.K. Corral also has
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Wyatt Earp ridding Tombstone of transgressors and seems to argue for the policy of 
containment. However, both narratives are tempered by a veiled anxiety. In M y  
Darling Clementine, a close analysis suggests that the film is not only dealing with the 
integration of foreign markets into an American sphere of influence, but that it is 
also addressing the American shift from isolationism to internationalism which 
leads inexorably toward conflict with its ideological enemy, the Soviet Union. In 
Gunfight at the O.K. Corral, the adoption of policies such as containment and massive 
retaliation, as exemplified by Wyatt Earp, ultimately fail. These films both reflect 
and speak to the American attitude in the 1940s and 1950s that a hot war was 
inevitable and articulate the anxiety that American policy would be unable to avoid 
such a conflict; thus the films function as cultural forums where these themes are 
hidden beneath the surface "bad faith" narrative in order to make them more 
palatable for their audiences.
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4. "Indochina was Dodge City":
Hour of the Gun, Doc, and the Demoralization 
of Wyatt Earp
Prior to the 1960s, depictions of Wyatt Earp on film had been largely positive. 
In spite of the subtle critiques of American foreign policy that were based on 
criticisms of certain aspects of Wyatt's character, the dominant narrative in films like 
My Darling Clementine and Gunfight at the O.K. Corral presented Wyatt as an 
admirable figure, if only superficially. However, by the late 1960s, the filmic 
character of Wyatt Earp changed drastically. As the United States became 
increasingly embroiled in external conflicts and, in particular, the Vietnam War, the 
darker side of the historical Wyatt Earp became more popular fodder for 
filmmakers. Filmmakers began to emphasize some of the more problematic aspects 
of Wyatt Earp, painting him as an obsessive bully, and, in some cases, a wholly evil 
monomaniac. There were two major films released between the time the American 
role in Vietnam shifted from an "advisory" one and the adoption of Nixon's policy 
of "Vietnamization": Hour of the Gun (1967) and Doc (1971). Though both films 
adopted a counter-cultural reckoning of institutional American heroes, they did so 
in very different ways. In Hour of the Gun, John Sturges appended the Wyatt Earp 
story he began with Gunfight at the O.K. Corral by presenting the first filmic depiction 
of Wyatt's "vendetta ride," a series of events that problematized Wyatt's search for 
justice by turning it into a case of personal vengeance. Meanhile, Doc abandoned
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any pretense of grey morality by presenting a Wyatt Earp who is completely corrupt 
and undoubtedly the villain of the piece. In doing so, each film offered a critique of 
the American foreign policy by presenting Wyatt Earp as a synecdoche of the United 
States.
The mid- to late-1960s were marked by increased American involvement in 
Vietnam. Between the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in August 1964 and April 1965, the 
American approach to Vietnam shifted drastically. In previous years, Americans 
had been present in Vietnam only as "advisors"; however, by 1965, American troops 
were facing direct fire from Vietcong forces. Prior to 1965, John McNaughton, a 
trusted advisor of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, had declared that 
American intentions in Vietnam were "to permit the people of South Vietnam to 
enjoy a better, freer way of life"(qtd. in Farber 142). But, by 1965, McNaughton 
recognized that the goal of the operation in Vietnam had shifted "to avoid a 
humiliating U.S. defeat" (qtd. in Farber 143). American forces implemented a 
concentrated bombing campaign in mid-1965 and began attempts to rally 
international support, with only limited success. A tally of American numbers in 
Vietnam reveals the astounding rate of the escalation. In 1961, the Americans had 
deployed some 3200 "advisors" to Vietnam; by 1963 this number had increased to 
16,300; and, in 1964, there were 23,300 advisors. By 1965, however, the Americans 
had 184,300 troops stationed in Vietnam (Farber 146).
In spite of increased American presence in Vietnam, the war was not going 
well. In 1968, the CIA reported that American forces were able to find and engage
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Vietcong forces in only one of every hundred attempts (Farber 147). These 
difficulties abroad were exacerbated as the operation began to lose credibility in the 
American media. There was a marked shift in coverage. As David Stiegerwald 
observes,
[b]efore late 1967, the typical war story detailed the adventures or 
misadventures of American soldiers; similarly, stories about the air 
war focused on the pilots' skill with their high-tech weaponry. The 
enemy remained faceless, nameless, and for the most part evil; indeed, 
U.S. reporting was dominated by stereotypes about both the Asians 
and guerilla fighters. (98)
Prior to 1967, there had been general assent amongst the press to such coverage, in 
spite of the occasional troubling report, such as CBS's coverage of marines 
destroying the village of Came Ne in August 1965. However, as the futility of the 
war and the ineffectiveness of American tactics in the jungle became difficult to 
ignore, a "credibility gap" developed (Stiegerwald 99). The press began to 
legitimize anti-war sentiments through coverage of events such as J. William 
Fulbright's rhetoric at the Senate Foreign Relations hearings and some officials 
began to disseminate to the press the doubts that existed within the administration 
(Stiegerwald 100).
The press's growing dissatisfaction with the war reflected growing public 
discontent with events abroad. The first major anti-war protest occurred in April of 
1965, when the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) held a rally at the
64
Washington monument. At the protest, SDS president Paul Potter said that "The 
incredible war in Vietnam has provided the razor . . .  that has finally severed the last 
vestiges of the illusion that morality and democracy are the guiding principles of 
American foreign policy" (qtd. in Farber 138 -  9). Potter's speech articulated a 
growing anxiety that American intervention abroad was running contrary to 
essential American values. Just as the American ascendancy to power in the 1950s 
had caused concern for Americans who had been brought up to view their nation as 
an independent actor, the Vietnam War sparked an anxiety that this new America 
had departed from the values that American cultural rhetoric had held dear.
After 1965, opposition to the war grew. As Farber observes, "Many people, in 
a phrase from their time, learned to 'question authority.' They started with their 
national leaders but extended their questioning to those who produced the 'news,' 
ran their schools, who claimed to teach them about values and morality" (140). 
Farber also notes that in the context of the Vietnam war, there was no "patriotic 
fervor" to enlist; rather, the primary impetus of those who did join up was to better 
their socioeconomic standing or to avoid being drafted (148). The protests soon 
moved from being characterized as fringe activities to including academics and 
other respected members of society. Some universities held "teach-ins," where 
students and their professors could discuss the war. Additionally, numerous church 
groups began to involve themselves in the anti-war movement. In 1966, Lutheran 
pastor Richard Neuhaus founded a group called Clergy and Laymen Concerned
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about Vietnam, and in 1967, the Neic York Times editorial page had similarly turned 
against the war (Farber 163). As Stiegerwald notes,
[the opponents of the war] were a widely varied group of citizens, 
gathered together in numerous groups and often at odds with one 
another over strategy and analysis. There was no single leader and no 
group dominated . . .  Those who flocked into or associated with one or 
several of the organizations were just as varied and hailed from all 
ranks and areas of American life: clergy, teachers, suburban 
housewives, students, union members, country folk. (105)
April rallies in New York and San Francisco drew over a quarter of a million people, 
while an October march on the Pentagon saw the attendance of 100,000. The 
reverberations of the Vietnam experience also directly affected those in power: a 
number of President Johnson's advisors including George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, 
Bill Moyers, and Robert McNamara resigned over the war.
In this climate, John Sturges felt moved to create a sequel to his earlier 
Gunfight at the O.K. Corral. Although in 1962 Sturges had asserted his belief that 
"Western characters must not be glamorized" and claimed that he "[didn't] go in for 
that Stuart Lake baloney" (qtd. in Hutton, "Showdown" 21), there are still strong 
elements of the heroic Earp of earlier films in Sturges' sequel. Hour of the Gun. As 
Cohen notes, the audience of this film is trained to sympathize with Wyatt Earp and 
his allies simply because these characters are initially fleshed out far more 
completely than their enemies (212). Additionally, this version of Wyatt has casting
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on his side; he is portrayed by James Garner, who had attained some fame for his 
portrayal of the likeable Maverick on the television series of the same name (213). 
Furthermore, the audience is presented early on with the facts that Wyatt's brothers 
Virgil and Morgan have been attacked; Virgil is maimed and Morgan killed, lending 
some credibility to Wyatt's desire for justice.
Thus, there is some sense that Wyatt's revenge is justified. As he 
systematically hunts down and kills the Clanton gang, some members of the 
audience likely sympathized with Wyatt and his quest. Sturges makes it clear that 
the audience is supposed to dislike Ike Clanton, and the contrast between the nattily 
attired Earps and the rag-tag Clanton family on the film's poster allows the audience 
to see in Earp a representation of American authority that was being forced, on the 
home front, to deal w ith the anti-establishmentarian behaviour of the anti-war 
movement and the counterculture. While many Americans from many walks of life 
did indeed support the protests, there was anything but public consensus over the 
war. Indeed, even as late as 1969, some public opinion polls found that a majority of 
Americans felt that protestors were "harmful to American life" for refusing to 
support the nation (Earber 167). As Cohen argues, "Sturges might well have 
expected that some members of his audience—those who were growing impatient 
with the radicals in the streets and on college campuses—would align with the 
lawmen" (214).
However, these attempts to lead the audience into identifying with Wyatt 
Earp at the expense of Ike Clanton and his gang generally fail. Rather, the dominant
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discourse in the film would suggest that Wyatt Earp — and the American 
establishment that he represents — is morally problematic. Ultimately, Hour of the 
Gun traces what Andrew Paul Hutton refers to as Wyatt Earp's "moral suicide" 
("Showdown" 24). In this reading, Wyatt is associated with excessive violence and 
abuse of authority.
The first indication that Hour of the Gun is offering an alternate primary 
discourse to those presented in the 1950s depictions of Wyatt Earp is that the film 
begins —not ends—with the gunfight at the O.K. Corral. The effect of this device is 
manifold. On one hand, this shift in structure emphasizes that the physical conflict 
itself is not of utmost significance; rather, the key problem at hand is the moral 
issues that the film will present to its audience. As Cohen argues, "the basis for the 
confrontation [between Earp and Clanton], it turns out, is a political and economic 
struggle: Ike is for 'freedom of the range' and control of this area of the west before 
the arrival of other eastern interests, designs that the Earps are not wholly aware of" 
(212). Additionally, the structural shift immediately associates Wyatt Earp with 
violence and disregard for legitimate authority: in the opening scenes of the film, the 
audience's first glimpses into Wyatt's personality are offered by the gunfight itself as 
well as his refusal to comply with Sheriff Bryan's attempts to arrest him (Cohen 214).
However, perhaps most importantly, the positioning of the gunfight at the 
beginning of the film allows Sturges to depict the events that historically occurred 
after the gunfight, which had been ignored by previous filmmakers. These events, 
often referred to as Wyatt Earp's "vendetta ride" or "ride of vengeance," involved
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Wyatt Earp engaging in a personal extra-legal mission to hunt down those whom he 
felt were responsible for acts of violence perpetrated against his brothers Virgil and 
Morgan. Though earlier films had utilized Virgil's maiming and Morgan's death as 
a plot device to justify Wyatt's personal stake in the Tombstone gunfight and to 
develop the animosity between Earp and the Clanton gang beyond a simple political 
feud. Hour of the Gun attempts to depict these events in a fashion more similar to the 
actual events. In doing so, Sturges challenges Earp's status as a representation of 
American values and more closely connects him to the Vietnam quagmire.
The actual events of the vendetta ride are complicated by various conflicting 
accounts from both sides of the feud. Virgil Earp had been shot in the streets of 
Tombstone on December 28,1881, while Morgan was killed on March 18,1882. 
According to historian Paula Mitchell Parks, at this point Wyatt Earp engaged in a 
war that saw him abandon any legal means of justice: "Wyatt Earp looked at his 
dead brother, the one intimates called his favourite, and decided that he was tired of 
all the political and legal maneuvering. From here on out, he would have no regard 
for any law but his own" (341). The first salvo in Wyatt Earp's war came just days 
after the death of Morgan. Wyatt, Doc Holliday, and two others, who have been 
inconclusively identified as Warren Earp and Sherman McMasters, were at the 
Tucson train depot, ostensibly to see brother Virgil off on the train. Most accounts 
have Earp and his allies carrying arms, though Tucson deputy J.W. Evans disagreed. 
At the depot, the Earps encountered Ike Clanton and Frank Stilwell, a member of the
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cowboy gang / The Earps killed Stilwell, while Clanton managed to escape. After 
this, Wyatt Earp and his gang were wanted men. Tombstone sheriff John Behan 
soon attempted to speak to W yatt—presumably to arrest him —but Wyatt refused to 
speak to him. Again, accounts of this exchange vary; the Earp-supporting Epitaph 
reported that Earp and the others simply walked away from Behan, while according 
to the Daily Nugget, Earp drew his gun on the outnumbered sheriff (Marks 349). At 
this point, Wyatt left town, and Behan formed a posse, comprised mainly of 
members of the cowboy gang, including John Ringo and Ike Clanton, to hunt him 
down.
On March 22' the second gun battle of the vendetta ride took place in the 
South Pass of the Dragoon Mountains. This time the victim was Florentine Cruz. 
According to George Goodfellow, who examined the body, Cruz was shot four 
times. The fourth shot, Goodfellow believed, "had been received after Cruz died" 
(Marks 354). At this point, some began to question Earp's motives and methods. 
Pima County Republican sheriff Bob Paul, who Marks notes was believed to have 
been a staunch Earp supporter, said that "[t]he so-called Earp gang, or faction if you 
please, was composed entirely of gamblers, who preyed upon the cowboys, and at 
the same time in order to keep up a shozo of having a legitimate calling, was organized 
into a sort of vigilance committee" (qtd. in Marks 354 -  5; emphasis added). Two
7 Like nearly everything else related to the vendetta ride, Stilwell's purpose at the 
depot is disputed. Some have him meeting a deputy whom he hoped would testify 
on his behalf on a stage robbery charge; the Epitaph suggested that he was either sent 
there by the cowboys to be killed, trying to get away himself, or seeking to kill the 
remaining Earps (Marks 346).
70
days later, another gunfight took place at either Iron Springs or Mescal Springs, 
depending on the source of the information. Once again, accounts of the event 
conflict with each other. The Epitaph claimed that six members of Earp's faction had 
been ambushed by nine cowboys, numbers that Wyatt himself verified in 1896. 
However, the Daily Nugget reported that in fact the Earps were forced to retreat after 
encountering just four cowboys, and that both sides opened fire simultaneously 
(Marks 357). Billy Breakenridge, one of Behan's deputies, later published an account 
that claimed that the Cowboys were hiding from the Earps and asserting that Wyatt 
had instigated the gunplay. Nevertheless, as Marks notes, "[m]ore important than 
the actual details of the f ight . . .  were the roles of the participants. The Earp party 
maintained that it was acting as a duly constituted posse trying to serve warrants on 
stage-robbing cowboys and killing one such notorious miscreant [Curly Bill 
Brocious] in the process" (359 -  60). However, Marks goes on to point out that "no 
stage robbery charge against Curly Bill has ever been uncovered" (360).
Ultimately, Wyatt Earp was forced to live on the run. He and his gang hid at 
the ranch of cattle baron Henry Hooker for a time, who protected the Earp faction 
from Behan's posse, which arrived on March 27* to arrest the fugitives. The conflict 
went far enough to prompt presidential attention; on May 3'' ,^ Chester A. Arthur 
threatened to place southeastern Arizona under martial law, believing that "it [had] 
become impracticable to enforce by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings the 
laws of the United States" and invoking his duty to "use the military forces for the 
purpose of enforcing . . .  the laws" (qtd. in Marks 377). Not long afterward, Wyatt's
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faction rode for Colorado and split up. Wyatt was never apprehended for the 
m urder of Stilwell, though Doc Holliday was arrested in Denver on May 15*.
Sturges' decision to depict a fictionalization of these events in Hour of the Gun 
suggests a radical departure from previous accounts of Wyatt Ear p's life. In doing 
so, Sturges highlights the moral dilemma that Earp's actions raised. Marks, writing 
on contemporary perceptions of the vendetta, observes that
Wyatt Earp's adherents at the time depicted him as a fugitive only 
because of an unjust legal machinery, a man earnestly trying to do the 
right (i.e. lawful) thing, but forced to hide out and assess his chances of 
receiving any kind of justice. His detractors saw him as a 
troublemaker whose machinations had caught up with him, forcing 
him to show his true colors by eluding the legal process. (371)
Parks' canny assessment, and Sturges' decision to depict such a divisive issue, helps 
to place Hour of the Gun within the framework of the cultural forum and bad faith 
models. Given Wyatt Earp's continuing status as a symbol of the United States and 
its foreign policy, Wyatt's actions can be read either as an ugly but necessary 
campaign for justice, or a morally reprehensible attempt to advance a personal 
agenda — allegorically, combating the rise of Communism in East Asia. Of course. 
Hour of the Gun places its support firmly in the latter camp. As Allen Barra has 
argued, "As [Hour of the Gun] progresses, [Wyatt's] ideals are stripped away one by 
one until he can no longer deny that his purpose is anything but vengeance" 
(Inventing 357). Wyatt's means to his end are appropriately troubling, given this
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reading; he uses a phony bounty to expose the whereabouts of his enemies so he can 
kill them himself, and violates international boundaries by chasing Ike Clanton into 
Mexico to finish what he has started. Thus, given this interpretation as well as Hour 
of the Gun's status as a revisionist sequel to Gunfight at the O.K. Corral, the film 
functions as a space wherein the audience can confront a depreciation of American 
ideals. The anxieties that were introduced in Gunfight at the O.K. Corral concerning 
the corrupting influence of America's rise to power had come to fruition. As the 
audience of Sturges' first take on Wyatt Earp feared, America's new position in the 
world had impelled it to abandon the ideals that formed the foundation of its 
culture, allowing it to sink into a new status as a bully who exercised its 
international muscle with complete disregard of its own professed morals.
Hour of the Gun was no runaway success at the box office. In spite of its star 
power, its presentation of the discomforting discourse as its primary narrative 
undoubtedly troubled many filmgoers. While there is certainly an adulatory 
narrative in the film —the audience is, after all, encouraged to despise Ike Clanton 
and perhaps choose to sympathize with Wyatt Earp if only as the lesser of two 
evils—the film stretches the bounds of the bad faith and cultural forum models 
nearly to their breaking point. However, the next major Hollywood Wyatt Earp 
film. Doc, would go even further.
By the time Doc was released in 1971, the United States had, if anything, 
become even more firmly entrenched in the Vietnam conflict. Richard Nixon was
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elected in 1968 after campaigning on his policy of "Vietnamization,"^ but in truth 
had no practical exit strategy. Instead, Nixon proposed to force negotiations by 
escalating American air raid campaigns (Farber 229). Enlistment rates fell as 
incidents of desertion rose; additionally, there were an estimated 800 cases of 
"fragging" — the shooting of unpopular officers (Farber 230). The strength of the 
anti-war movement grew as well and began to involve many returning GIs, some of 
whom took to publishing pamphlets condemning the war. In 1967 there had been 
just three such underground papers published, but by 1972, the number had grown 
to nearly 250 (Farber 230). The mainstream press also began to view the anti-war 
movement in a different light, and even conservative publications were portraying 
the anti-war movement more positively (Slotkin 580). The revelation of the Mylai 
massacre by the New York Times and Life magazine in 1969 further galvanized the 
nation against the war in Vietnam. According to Slotkin, "More than any other 
single event, the revelation transformed the terms of the ideological and political 
debates on the war, lending authority to the idea that American society was in the 
grip of a 'madness' whose sources might be endemic to our national character"
(581). In 1971, the Pentagon Papers were leaked. According to Farber, these 
documents "detailed the pattern of deception that characterized the presidential 
administrations' portrayals of the war to the American people" (233). Polls taken in 
1968 had suggested that Americans viewed the war as a "mistake" (Slotkin 579); by
* Nixon's Vietnamization policy sought to reduce American involvement in the war 
by increasing the South Vietmanese capability to defend itself against North 
Vietnam and the Vietcong.
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1972, a poll suggested that a majority of Americans not only were opposed to the 
war but viewed it as "immoral" (Farber 259).
Western films reflected the vehement anti-war attitude that was beginning to 
dominate the national mind. This period saw the development of films that 
depicted what Slotkin calls the "demoralization" of the Western. According to 
Slotkin, "the negative aspects of the adventure . . .  now form[ed] the center of the 
narrative and suggest[ed] an implicit rejection of the ideological projects that 
motivated counterinsurgency" (592). For Slotkin, the "guiding myth" of the 
Western had, in the 1960s and 1970s, been called into question, and the chaotic 
America of this period was unable to renew its belief in this myth (626). Michael 
Coyne similarly argues that the Vietnam War sounded the death knell of the 
Western myth. The genre, Coyne suggests, had died with American optimism and 
had been replaced by dark Vietnam narratives as the war replaced the Western 
experience as the "most resonant" American historical experience (191). The films of 
the 1970 no longer mythicized the nation's Western heroes; rather they depicted 
figures such as Wyatt Earp as personifications of the worst aspects of the American 
establishment.
Though Slotkin cites Sam Peckinpah's bloody film The Wild Bunch as the 
exemplum of this trend. Doc provides what is possibly an even more overt case of 
the demonization of the Western hero and the "demoralization" of the Western. The 
poster for the film proclaimed that "on a good day, [Wyatt Earp] might pistol-whip 
a drunk, shoot an unarmed man, bribe a politician, and get paid off by an outlaw.
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He was a U.S. Marshal" (Hutton, "Showdown" 24). This Wyatt Earp is a "self- 
righteous, hypocritical sadist with a delightfully Nixonian vision of law that is 
totally self-serving" (Hutton, "Showdown" 24). In this film, the Cowboys are clearly 
meant to be analogous with the Vietcong. They are helpless before the 
overwhelmingly superior firepower of Wyatt and his gang. In addition, the long 
hair of the Cowboy gang connects them to the hippie movement. The screenwriter, 
Pete Hamill, made explicit the connection between this portrayal of Wyatt Earp and 
his own experience in Vietnam:
I went to Vietnam in 1966, and it was evident to almost everyone 
except the military that the war was wrong, but that we were 
continuing to fight because of some peculiar notions of national macho 
pride, self-righteousness, and the missionary spirit. I started to realize 
that within Lyndon Johnson there was a western unspooling. In that 
western the world was broken down into White Hats and Black Hats. 
Indochina was Dodge City, and the Americans were some collective 
version of Wyatt Earp. (qtd. in Hutton, "Showdown" 24)
Thus, in Doc, Wyatt Earp becomes the symbol of American authoritarianism 
abroad. He represents the most profane excesses of American foreign policy in the 
early 1970s. Doc's Wyatt is emasculated through his latent homosexuality as well as 
his impotence in a fistfight with Ike Clanton. He has ceased to be the robust model 
of American masculinity. Wyatt's ruthlessness is a product of his unrequited 
feelings for Doc Holliday, and through this presentation. Doc serves a scathing
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critique of the United States that suggests the country has completely lost its way.
As Wyatt, the synecdoche for contemporary America, is completely stripped of 
American ideals of masculinity, so too is the United States stripped of any admirable 
qualities for the film's audience (Cohen 214-5).
Doc offers no subtle counter-narrative; its attention to these angst-inducing 
issues is explicit and unrelenting. Thus, the film fails to support the bad faith and 
cultural forum models. However, in doing so, the film becomes the exception that 
proves the rule. Indeed, the more vilified Wyatt becomes, the less successful the 
film becomes. Doc is a case in point. Of all the films, it fared by far the poorest at 
the box office, and is nearly universally disparaged by critics. Hutton notes that 
"Doc was a total failure at the box office," in contrast to "[f]ilms such as My Darling 
Clementine and Gunfight at the O.K. Corral [which] won great public acceptance, both 
at the time of their release and since in television rebroadcasts and on videotape" 
("Showdown" 25). By refusing to conceal its discourse of moral outrage beneath a 
counter-discourse. Doc offended its audience's sensibilities; it offered no comfort in 
the face of its onslaught against Wyatt Earp and the Vietnam War. Instead, the film 
forced its American audience to gaze directly into a mirror that highlighted only the 
nation's most disturbing qualities, a visage that was not an appealing one for 
filmgoers.
Both Hour of the Gun and Doc presented its audiences with an alternate take 
on the Wyatt Earp legend. Hour of the Gun's depiction of the vendetta ride and the 
film's status as a sequel to Gunfight at the O.K. Corral served as a recognition that the
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fears of Gunfight's 1957 audience had indeed come to pass: with the United States' 
new powers and responsibility, the nation had abandoned its adherence to the ideals 
that served as a basis for its culture, including those of free-will, democracy, justice, 
and self-determination. This film was far more overt with its depiction of the 
troubling aspects of American foreign policies than Sturges' previous take on Wyatt 
Earp had been, and suffered at the box office, perhaps as a result. Nevertheless, its 
ticket sales were far greater than the sales of tickets to Doc, which confronted its 
audience with the hideous visage of the worst excesses of the American 
establishment in Vietnam. Doc offered no respite from this portrait, and provided 
no safe haven from the implicit guilt of the enfranchised American citizen. Doc's 
Nixonian Earp was an apt shift for a post-Mylai, post-Pentagon Papers America, but 
was perhaps too grim an indictment to be palatable for its intended audience. In 
any case, Harris Yulin's portrayal of Earp in Doc would be the last depiction of 
Wyatt on film for over fifteen years.
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5. "The Last Charge of Wyatt Earp and 
His Immortals": Tombstone, Popular Memory, and 
The New World Order
The gunfight at the O.K. Corral would not be depicted on movie theatre 
screens again until 1993. In that year, director George P. Cosomatos brought Wyatt 
Earp to life once again in Tombstone, a major Hollywood picture with a strong cast 
that included Kurt Russell as Wyatt Earp, Val Kilmer as Doc Holliday, Powers 
Boothe as Curly Bill Brocius, and cameo appearances by Charlton Heston and 
Robert Mitchum. The film was highly regarded by many film goers and grossed 
over $55 million in its theatrical release. Apparently, film audiences were once again 
finding currency in the Wyatt Earp myth, to the point that they were able to stomach 
the somewhat less successful Wyatt Earp within less than a year of Tombstone's 
release. The reasoning behind the revival in the story of the gunfight at the O.K. 
Corral and the success of Tombstone speaks to a new set of American anxieties 
regarding the nation's role in the world. By 1993, the Cold War was over. However, 
any optimism that Americans had about the collapse of Soviet Russia was tempered 
once again by an unease about what shape the world of the future was to take.
While the Cold War had taken with it the tensions of mutually assured destruction 
and evil empires, in its wake it left a new set of problems. For over forty years, 
American foreign policy had been relatively static with a single enemy to focus on. 
With the crumbling of enemy's empire, a new approach was necessary, and it was
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unclear what form that approach would take. Additionally, the ascendance of other 
nations — notably Japan and Germany— as economic powers intensified American 
anxiety regarding the sustainability of its empire. As the ideological war came to a 
close and the potential for an economic one developed, fears regarding the 
American ability to remain an economic powerhouse without the impetus of a 
massive defense build-up weighed heavily on some peoples' minds. With 
Tombstone, audiences were able once again to look to the American past for solace. 
The film rendered American history in mythic terms and allowed audiences to 
psychologically deal with their anxieties in a narrative that is in many ways 
supremely triumphal. To this end. Tombstone functions as a narrative that 
mythologizes not only Wyatt Earp but also American Cold War history, while 
simultaneously articulating the anxieties of the new world order.
Tombstone was but the latest in a series of Western films that appeared toward 
the end of the 1980s and into the early 1990s. Prior to this period, the Western had 
not been a popular genre among filmgoers, nor had it been since the early 1970s. As 
the United States in 1980 elected a president who marked himself as a Western actor, 
some filmmakers hoped for a revival in the genre, but the three Westerns released 
that year —The Long Riders, Tom Horn, and the epic Heaven's Gate, all flopped (Coyne 
185). The distaste for the genre continued throughout the 1980s, prompting 
Anthony Lejeune's 1989 lamentation that the genre was as good as dead (23). 
Western films no longer had the cultural power that they once did. After Vietnam, 
the casting of American expansion and subjugation of an Other was far more
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problematic a myth than it once had been. However, as Richard Slotkin has argued, 
while the Western had been pushed to the periphery of Hollywood genre films, this 
"did not entail the disappearance of those underlying structures of myth and 
ideology that had given the genre its culture force" (633). Instead, the tropes and 
structures of the Western "were abstracted from the elaborately historicized context 
of the Western and parceled out among genres that used their relationship to the 
Western to define both the disillusioning losses and the extravagant potential of the 
new [post-Vietnam] era" (633). Slotkin attributes the necessity of this abstraction to 
the failure of "the progressive historical myth of westward expansion" to rationalize 
the necessity of violence. Thus, a number of films did appear in the 1980s that while 
not being explicitly Westerns did borrow heavily from the Western form. Many of 
these were science fiction, horror, or "urban vigilante" films. Slotkin pays special 
attention to the urban vigilante genre, which is typified by films such as Clint 
Eastwood's "Dirty Harry" series. According to Slotkin,
[wjhat makes the urban vigilante genre different from the Western is 
its 'post-frontier' setting. Its world is urbanized, and its possibilities 
for progress and redemption are constricted by vastly ramified 
corporate conspiracies, and by monstrous accumulations of wealth, 
power, and corruption. Its heroes draw energy from the same rage 
that draws the paranoids, psychopaths, mass murderers, and terrorists 
of the mean streets, and their victories are almost never socially 
redemptive in the Western mode. (634)
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This genre, like the slasher horror film, inverts the myth of the frontier: "[t]he 
borders their heroes confront are impermeable to the forces of progress and civilized 
enlightenment; if anything, the flow of aggressive power runs in the opposite 
direction, with the civilized world threatened with subjugation to or colonization by 
the forces of darkness" (Slotkin 635). Meanwhile, Slotkin notes, science fiction films 
like Star Wars "allegorize the condition and imaginative freedom—the power to 
imagine the most magical or utopian possibilities — by keeping real historical 
references at a distance" (636).
Ultimately, Slotkin suggests that this rejection of the Western points to a 
"reaction against the myth /  ideology of liberal progressivism in the backwash of 
the 1960s," and notes that "other factors, operating more subtly and over the longer 
term, seem likely to prolong the eclipse of the Western and promote other 
historically oriented genres in its place" (638). As an exemplar of this trend, Slotkin 
points to Brian De Palma's The Untouchables. Set in Chicago, this film narrates the 
conflict between Eliot Ness and A1 Capone. However, in spite of its urban setting 
and apparent generic alignment as a gangster film, structurally, the film has much in 
common with the Western. In this film, Michael Coyne notes,
Kevin Costner's Eliot Ness effectively ran the gamut of movie Wyatt 
Earps, starting as an idealistic lawman akin to Henry Fonda in My 
Darling Clementine, becoming buddy to Sean Connery's Irish cop in the 
style of Burt Lancaster to Kirk Douglas in Gunfight at the O.K. Corral. . .
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and ending as a cold blooded killer similar to James Garner in Hour of 
the Gun. (187)
Slotkin, too, points out links between The Untouchables and the Western, identifying 
it with "the town-tamer and counter insurgency Westerns of the 1960s. Eliot Ness .. . 
is the stranger in town, a Puritan with a hidden gift for violence who has to clean up 
a city ruled by criminals who have corrupted the authorities" (641). Slotkin 
continues to note that The Untouchables "[conflates] the 'historical' space of the 
Depression with the 'Mythic' space of Westerns," resulting in "a radical departure 
from the nominal historical source and the ideological limitations of the TV series — a 
departure that allows them to make a powerful case for the political necessity of 
'extraordinary violence'" (641 -  2).
These films —which cast the Western mythic space in an alternate historical or 
pseudo-historical framework, constitute what Slotkin terms the "post-Western."
The post-Western emphasizes the necessity of the mythic structure of the Western 
for American audiences while suggesting that "the Western may no longer provide 
the most important of our ideologically symbolic languages" (642). Thus, the 
essential generic trappings of the W estern—the open frontier and the settlement of 
that liminal space — ceased to be of significant value to the audiences of the 1980s. 
This rejection may indicate that the essential discourse of the Western, dealing with 
the anxieties of America's role in the world, had similarly ceased to be the most 
pressing concern of film audiences. The thawing of the Cold War and the apparent 
American victory over its ideological nemesis stripped the American public of the
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overwhelming anxiety regarding their role in the world. In some ways, the success 
in the Cold War ultimately justified the angst-inducing elements of American 
diplomacy, mollifying the audiences for the time being. The disconcertion that 
Americans felt shifted from being related to the external — represented by the wide 
open spaces — to the internal, metaphorically realized by the enclosed urban settings 
of Chicago or the suburban landscape of the slasher film.
However, this comfort with America's status in the international community 
could not last. Indeed, as the Soviet Union went through its death throes in 1989 
and 1990, the Western appeared to be regaining its audience. A number of Westerns 
appeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s that marked a return to the standard 
form, albeit w ith some modifications. The most notable of these were Dances With 
Wolves (1990) and Unforgiven (1992), which not only garnered financial success but 
became the first and second Western films since Cimarron (1931) to win the Academy 
Award for Best Picture. Significantly, both of these films were in many ways 
metafictive: Dances With Wolves was a flimsy attempt to invert the "typical" roles of 
Native Americans and the Cavalry in the Western, though Coyne has observed that 
the film merely reworks themes that had been previously dealt with in Broken Arrow, 
Run of the Arroiv and Little Big Man and ultimately communicates "a conservative 
message at the core of its countercultural idyll" by purposefully avoiding the issue 
of miscegenation, resulting in "a hymn to an attractive (and ecologically 
harmonious) culture in which nice young WASP couples might find a home" (188).
84
Unforgiven, meanwhile, presented audiences with a "dark, savage tale" with "much 
contemplation on the nature and psychology of violence" (Coyne 188).
These films were followed by Tombstone, which similarly developed 
metafictive qualities, though in a considerably different way. While Dances with 
Wolves and Unforgiven examined the Western through some degree of inversion or 
generic manipulation. Tombstone moved in the other direction by adhering fairly 
closely to the conventions of the town-tamer Western. Nevertheless, the metafictive 
trend is developed through the use of intertextuality and a conscious effort to 
fabricate authenticity. The effect of this is that Tombstone is capable of combining a 
reconsideration of the western myth with a simultaneous reinforcement of the 
values that the myth entails. In doing so. Tombstone serves as an expression of the 
cultural forum that works to address the audience's anxiety about the new world 
order following the Cold War while providing an adulatory narrative that 
champions the gunfighter hero and the values he represents.
Like M y Darling Clementine and Gunfight at the O.K. Corral, Tombstone reflects 
a sea change in American foreign policy; however, while M y Darling Clementine and 
Gunfight at the O.K. Corral represented the troubling nature of the arrival of Cold 
War diplomacy. Tombstone dramatizes the uncertainty associated with the end of 
those same policies. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, foreign policy had 
remained relatively static for over forty years. As Kenneth A. Oye has argued, "[t]he 
boundary between the Eastern and Western blocs came to define mutually exclusive 
zones of military protection, economic production, and relative political
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homogeneity. In subsequent years, this core system was projected onto the 
periphery as the Soviet-American rivalry infused civil wars and regional conflicts 
throughout the Third World. Routinized geopolitical rivalry between the United 
States and the Soviet Union operated largely in defense of the postwar status quo" 
(3). However, with the collapse of one of the poles of the Cold War order, this 
structure was no longer a reliable one. As James E. Winkates notes, "the premises 
underlying that extraordinary consistency have now perished or have so 
fundamentally changed as to require new rationales, priorities, and approaches to 
ensure the defense of the United States" (31; Oye 3). Even in his moderate study of 
the implications of this shift in the American position, historian Stephen Burman felt 
compelled to observe that
the euphoria surrounding American-inspired and led victory in the 
Gulf war has, paradoxically, given rise to visions, or nightmares, of a 
resurgent, militaristic America dominating the new world order to an 
extent that will make its hegemonic role in the post-1945 era look pale 
by comparison, (ix)
In the wake of this shift in the world balance of power, it seemed as though 
the world might return to some of the conflicts that had dominated the inter-war 
years. Oye observes that in the early 1990s, the liberalization of the former Soviet 
bloc resulted in a resurgence in cultural, territorial, and political struggles that had 
festered between the World Wars (18). Furthermore, the economies of Germany and 
Japan ascended to a position of power once more, compelling the neighbours of
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those nations to recall their rise to power after World War 1 and think 
apprehensively of the historical results of those labours (Oye 18). Such 
maneuverings did not go unnoticed in the United States, and the acquisition of 
American businesses by German and Japanese interests spawned a "resurgence of 
nativism" and "activated latent xenophobia" in America (Oye 22). Additionally, 
there was some concern that the reduction or withdrawal of American and Soviet 
forces in the Third World could create a power vacuum that would lead to renewed 
conflict, especially in Europe: "To state the obvious," Oye comments, "the effects [of 
the postwar order] must hinge in part on preexisting levels of violence. On the one 
hand, a Europe that has been at peace for forty years may become less militarized 
but cannot become more peaceful" (18 -  19). There also existed concern about the 
potential for conflicts in Russia itself, as Moscow continued to use force to stifle 
independence movements in former Soviet states (Oye 22).
Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War did produce some signs that pointed to 
a rosier future for the world. In addition to these potential crises, there was also the 
outbreak of a hot war in the Persian Gulf as Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The 
United States was able to muster an international coalition to combat the dictator. 
Oye notes, "The scope of economic sanctions, the effective use of the United 
Nations, the formulation of a multinational deterrent force in Saudi Arabia, and the 
coalition-wide attack on Iraqi forces in Kuwait would have been impossible only 
two years ago" (20). In this respect, at least, the breakdown of Communist Russia 
provided some hope for the future.
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Under these circumstances, it is appropriate that a film like Tombstone would 
be released. Tombstone in many ways marked a return to the Westerns that were 
released in the 1950s: it is a clear example of the "town-tamer" Western wherein an 
outsider arrives in a chaotic town that is plagued by an autocratic power center in 
the Cowboy gang and ineffectual law enforcement in the corrupt Sheriff Behan and 
the elderly Marshal Fred White. Marshal Fred White tells Wyatt that Sheriff John 
Behan "ain 't no law. The only law around here is the Cowboys," while White 
himself is somewhat decrepit and incapable of any physical enforcement of the law. 
Like the settlements in many town-tamer Westerns, Tombstone straddles the line 
between civilization and savagery. Upon arriving in town, Wyatt and his brothers 
marvel at the bustling mining tow n—"Hot damn, this burg's jumping" comments 
M organ—and are told by Behan that Tombstone will be bigger than San Francisco in 
just a few years. However, Tombstone's pretension to metropolitan status is 
immediately undercut: just as Behan lauds Wyatt's suggestion of building a 
racetrack to "send a signal [Tombstone is] growing up," their discussion is 
interrupted by a shooting in the street, prompting Doc Holliday to observe 
sarcastically, "Very cosmopolitan."
Wyatt is soon, but reluctantly, forced into the role of the town's saviour. He 
resists this position but is compelled to act for the sake of his brothers who volunteer 
to serve as the law after Fred White is killed by Curly Bill Brocius. The Earps 
inevitably come into conflict with the Cowboys, leading to the confrontation at the 
O.K. Corral. Subsequently, after Virgil Earp is shot, costing him the use of his arm.
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and Morgan Earp is m urdered while playing billiards, Wyatt takes up the mantle of 
United States Marshal and commences his "vendetta ride" to eliminate the Cowboy 
menace from Tombstone.
As a town-tamer Western, Tombstone may be the most mythicized 
representation of Wyatt Earp to date. In this reading, Wyatt is not merely a 
gunfighter hero, but is positioned as an avenging agent of God. The film opens with 
the Cowboy gang murdering a Mexican lawman at his wedding. After this deed 
they are accosted by a priest, who warns them about a coming judgment by quoting 
the Biblical book of Revelation. As Ringo translates for the rest of the Cowboys, 
"There came the pale horse, and the man who sat on him was death. And hell 
followed with him." The scene then immediately cuts to Wyatt's arrival in Tucson 
on an "iron horse" (Cohen 219). Wyatt's supernatural qualities are further 
emphasized later in the film during the vendetta ride (Cohen 219). When Wyatt 
begins exacting his vengeance at the Tucson train station by killing Stilwell, he 
allows Ike Clanton to escape, though not before admonishing him to tell the 
Cowboys that "I'm  coming! And hell's coming with me!" Wyatt's hunt is 
excessively stylized as he and his posse perform acrobatic feats of riding and combat 
while the Cowboys scatter ahead of them. After the Cowboys catch Wyatt's posse in 
a crossfire, Wyatt marches out of his hiding place to confront Curly Bill one-on-one. 
Curly Bill raises his gun to fire, but, providentially, is out of bullets. Wyatt raises his 
own rifle and kills the Cowboy as an off-screen voice cries out "Jesus Christ!" 
Afterward, when Wyatt's posse is recuperating near a stream. Doc Holliday declares
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that Wyatt is "Down by the creek, walking on water." Morgan Earp similarly 
positions Wyatt in divine terms, repeatedly telling Wyatt that he is "the one."
This reading, in spite of director George P. Cosomatos' assertions that the film 
is "as accurate as possible," positions Tombstone as an allegory for the recent Iraq 
war. As Colleen Coughlin has argued, "[l]aw in Tombstone provides a vehicle for 
addressing the problem of vengeance and civil order in a community. Law is also a 
ready fool to be manipulated for purposes of power and control of capital. It is 
about sanctioned violence, who can use it and in what situations it will be accepted" 
(150). Wyatt Earp's quest in Tombstone is, in this reading, absolutely justified; the 
contrast between him and the Cowboys could not be more explicit. While the 
Cowboys are initially presented to the audience as destroying a wedding by 
murdering the groom and priest, raping the bride, and then consuming the wedding 
feast, Wyatt's first appearance involves protecting a horse from an abusive stable 
hand. The Cowboys are drunken and slovenly, while the Earps are impeccably 
attired; indeed, Wyatt's long black frock coat and white collar is reminiscent of a 
priest's garb. Finally, while the Cowboys are adversarial in response to being 
punished for their transgressions of the law, Wyatt's vendetta is spurred by the 
ambushes perpetrated against his family. Even Wyatt's most obvious 
transgression—his abandonment of his common-law wife Mattie in favour of the 
actress Josephine Marcus —is rendered unproblematically through the depiction of 
Mattie as a completely unlikable drug addict who all but drives Wyatt away. In this 
reading, Wyatt once again functions as a synecdoche for the United States and his
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"reckoning," as Doc Holliday calls it, as a just retribution for the attack on his allies, 
who are analogous to Kuwait. Thus, the Cowboy gang, autocratic and wholly evil, 
serves as an apt symbol of Saddam Hussein. As Slotkin has suggested, "Hussein .. . 
was the perfect enemy for a modern Frontier-Myth scenario, combining the barbaric 
cruelty of a 'Geronimo' with the political power and ambition of a Hitler" (651).
This depiction of Hussein was emphasized in the discourse of President George 
Bush, who suggeseted that "the violence of the Gulf War . . .  regenerated the 
national spirit and moral character by expiating the defeat in Vietnam" (Slotkin 652). 
Thus, Slotkin's notion of "regeneration through violence" is exercised in the national 
discourse once again .^
However, Tombstone functions not only as an allegorization of present-day 
conflicts but also as a meditation on America's recent past. While George 
Cosomatos' commentary on the digital video disc release of Tombstone emphasizes 
the film's supposed authenticity, extolling the virtues of the cast's "real moustaches" 
and the process of aging the clothing and using photographs and newspaper reports 
of the times to develop the "atmosphere of the period," the film contains a strong 
element of retrospection. To this end. Tombstone hearkens back not only to the past 
of the American West, but also to the Cold War through repeated allusions to older
 ^An alternate reading, suggested by Allen Barra, would paint Tombstone as being an 
allegory for a shift in national attention from foreign to domestic affairs. In this 
interpretation, the Cowboys are analogous with gangs, complete with their colours 
(the red sashes) and Wyatt Earp is American authority being forced to move from 
one conflict to another {Inventing 364). Wyatt's reluctance to involve himself in the 
conflict and his interest in money may thus be read as a meditation on class issues 
that might contribute to rises in gang activity, such as poverty and ghettoization.
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films. The first such allusion comes in the opening pseudo-documentary, which 
splices together footage of early newsreels, older Western films, and footage of 
Tombstone's incarnations of Wyatt Earp and Doc Holliday. This prefatory material is 
punctuated by a scene from the earliest example of a Western film. The Great Train 
Robbery. The effect of this faux newsreel at the beginning of the film is a suggestion 
that mythical depictions of the American past contain some truth. The newsreel 
conflates the fictional past with the real past, thus providing the older Westerns with 
an authority as records of events. Tombstone's recollective reading is also reinforced 
casting and narrative allusion. Actors with strong lineages in the Western genre fill a 
number of small roles in the film: Charlton Heston plays ranch owner Henry 
Hooker; John Ford's godson Harry Carey, Jr. portrays Fred White; and Robert 
Mitchum narrates the opening and closing of the film. But more striking than even 
these allusions is Tombstone's repeated use of scenes modeled nearly directly from 
older Westerns, many of which come from older depictions of Wyatt Farp. The 
most blatant of such scenes is the standoff between Wyatt Farp and Ike Clanton after 
Curly Bill kills Fred White. As Ike, confident in his superior numbers, orders Wyatt 
to turn Bill loose, Wyatt turns his gun on the Cowboy and warns him, "You're first, 
get it? Your friends might get me in a rush but not before I turn your head into a 
canoe." This scene is a clear allusion to Gunfight at the O.K. Corral, save for the fact 
that in Gunfight, Shanghai Pierce is the recipient of Wyatt's warning. The Farps' and 
Doc Holliday's walk to the O.K. Corral in Tombstone similarly recalls Gunfight at the 
O.K. Corral, though in Tombstone the walk is interrupted by a gang of kids who run
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past playing at guns themselves—an event that alludes to an encounter of Marshal 
Kane's in High Noon. Thus, Tombstone bolsters the mythic depiction of the West in 
American history, and in doing so simultaneously sanctifies the past it represents 
which, in their overt narratives sanctifies American intervention overseas and Cold 
War foreign policy, lending additional support to the laudatory reading of the text 
as an abstraction of the Persian Gulf War.
Clearly, the dominant discourse in Tombstone is one that sanctifies the use of 
lethal force in certain situations. The film mythologizes the use of violence in 
nineteenth-century America as a way for its audience to understand violence in 
twentieth-century America and the nation's recent battles against dictatorial enemies 
in the Soviet Union and Iraq. However, this reading is problematized by a subtle 
but nevertheless significant counter-discourse that challenges the motivations of 
Wyatt and his brothers. This reading emphasizes that Wyatt's sole motivation in 
Tombstone is financial gain. As Colleen Coughlin argues, "Wyatt is not in 
Tombstone to act as a lawman. The film makes clear that Wyatt, his brothers 
Morgan and Virgil, and all three of their wives are in town to make their fortune" 
(148). Coughlin additionally notes that, in Tombstone, Wyatt is never motivated by 
any sort of altruism. He absolutely refuses to accept any position in law 
enforcement, and even when the dangerous Curly Bill is shooting up the main 
streets of Tombstone, his suggestion is to "let it alone." He is unswayed by his 
brother Virgil's decision to take up the badge of United States marshal, even when 
Virgil angrily argues that they are making money off of the suffering of the
93
townspeople. Wyatt is only coerced into action when the battle becomes personal 
and his brothers are in danger; he acts not out of a genuine sense of justice but rather 
out of a quest for personal vengeance. As Hutton notes, "none of the writers or 
directors working on the latest Earp films had an ideological axe to grind, but they 
were determined to expose the darker truth regarding Earp's career" ("Showdown" 
30).
Thus, the subtle reminder that conflicts cannot be cast in such a Manichean 
light compromises the narrative that would sanctify violence as a means of 
combating an evil dictator. While the Cowboys in Tombstone are undoubtedly the 
villains of the piece, Wyatt is not opposed to them for the chaos that they impose on 
the town, but rather because they have attacked him personally. Furthermore, 
Wyatt's motivation to be in Tombstone —he tells his brothers that in Tombstone they 
are going to "make their fortunes" — can be connected with the possibility of ulterior 
motives in the United States' intervention in Iraq that would conflate the American 
leadership's interest in the national integrity of Kuwait with their interest in Kuwaiti 
oil.
Ultimately, Tombstone fulfills its purpose as a cultural forum and a bad faith 
narrative. While there is a clear dominant narrative that would justify the use of 
force in extreme circumstances and that mythologizes American foreign policy in 
the Cold War and beyond. Tombstone simultaneously, but subtly, questions the 
motivations of the United States in its continued interventionism. Tombstone 
articulates an unease in the American population. While the nation might, like
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Wyatt Earp in Tombstone, prefer to retire from its role as an international police force, 
it is drawn back into the conflict by its status as a superpower as well as its greed. In 
this reflection of American anxiety. Tombstone continues the thrust of Wyatt Earp 
films throughout the Cold War. Since World War II, Wyatt has continued to operate 
as a symbol of the United States and its changing role in the world. Tombstone 
brings this depiction full circle. While Henry Fonda's portrayal allegorized 
American uneasiness about its newfound position as a world superpower, Kurt 
Russell's performance accentuated once again the anxieties of a nation in the midst 
of a new liminal state. The anxieties at the dawn of the Cold War had seen fruition 
in the Vietnam War, and, twenty years after that bloody conflict. Tombstone once 
again expresses a fear of the discontinuity between an ideal America and the real 
America.
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6. Conclusion
Wyatt Earp remains one of the most resonant figures in American historical 
mythology. At the time of the writing of this thesis, American cable network HBO 
announced the casting of the latest actor to step into Earp's spurs, to be featured in a 
limited number of episodes in its gritty Western series Deadivood. Given the history 
of Earp's appearances on film prior as outlined in this thesis, it should come as no 
surprise that Wyatt Earp should ride again; as the United States continues its War on 
Terror and rattles its saber at new ideological enemies, Wyatt Earp has once again 
become a relevant cultural symbol.
Indeed, the myth of Wyatt Earp is likely to remain a powerful and useful one 
for American culture. As this thesis has proved, Wyatt Earp occupies a particular 
space in the American pantheon. His conflicted position as both a "rounder" and a 
businessman and his tenuous position between legitimate authority and vigilante 
justice has made Wyatt a remarkably potent symbol to American culture. Wyatt 
Earp offers American audiences a space wherein their own anxieties about issues 
such as hegemony and imperialism can be tacitly addressed in an environment that 
offers no threat of reprisals. Above all, Wyatt is a figure through which Americans 
can project their own views as well as entertain alternative views whenever the 
reality of American involvement in the world seems to run contrary to American 
ideals of individualism and democracy. He serves as a figure that at once 
champions American intervention—he is the one who is capable of making
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Tombstone safe for the schoolmarm and religion—but also symbolizes the dangers 
that are inherent to such endeavors. While Wyatt may indeed make the frontier 
town safe for "civilization/' he does so only at great cost and often with morally 
troubling methods. Therefore, Wyatt Earp occupies a very particular space in the 
American Western myth. In a genre that draws its popular strength from its 
liminality and ability to allegorize transitions, Wyatt Earp is capable of personifying 
the United States as it negotiates sea changes in American culture.
Through the Cold War, the Wyatt Earp legend gained particular currency. As 
the United States emerged from World War II as a superpower, Wyatt Earp 
provided a cultural forum wherein the nation could examine its newfound power 
and the anxieties associated with that power. Through the films My Darling 
Clementine and Gunfight at the OK Corral, audience members engaged in the 
adulatory narrative of American strength and power, while simultaneously dealing 
with a discourse that problematized that power and the obligations it entailed.
Years later, as the United States became embroiled in the Vietnam conflict, Wyatt 
Earp became an allegorical figure that articulated the nation's questions about its 
role as an international authority and the moral questions associated with its 
exercising of this power to advance its own political agenda of making the world 
safe from Communism. Twenty years later, Wyatt Earp would ride again in 
Tombstone, a film that reexamined American foreign policy during the Cold War 
while turning an eye to the new world order where American capitalism had 
ostensibly won out over Russian Communism.
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There is little doubt that the Wyatt Earp myth will continue to be relevant to 
American audiences; the only question is which Wyatt will be depicted next: the 
noble cavalier of My Darling Clementine, the sadistic bully of Doc, or a new version? 
In any event, it is clear that the myth of Wyatt Earp has not yet ridden off into its last 
sunset.
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